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CONTINUING-CARE COMMUNITIES FOR THE ELDERLY:
POTENTIAL PITFALLS AND PROPOSED REGULATION
In 1977, 23.5 million people-one in every nine persons in the
United States-were sixty-five years of age or older.' By 2010, when
the "baby boom" children are only beginning to reach age sixty-
five, the number of elderly,2 persons in this country is expected to
be thirty-four million. That number is expected to reach fifty-two
million by 2030, at which time the proportion of our populace over
sixty-five should peak at somewhere between fourteen and twenty-
two percent.8
Even now, the provision of adequate medical care and housing
for the elderly is one of the nation's most pressing social problems.
To date, the primary institutional solution has been the nursing
home: 4 more than 1.3 million elderly people were living in nursing
I NATIONAL CLEARiNG HousE ON AcmiN, ADMINmTRAToN ON AGING, OFFICE OF
HUmAN DEVELoPMENT SERVICEs, DEP'T Or HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
FACTS ABOUT OLDER AsmlcANs 1978, DHEW PuB. No. (OHDS) 79-20006 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as FAcTs ABoUT OrmER AMamcANs].
2 Throughout this Comment, "elderly" will be used to refer to people who are
65 years of age or older.
a HousE SELECT Comax. ON POPULATION, 95TH CoNG., 2D SEss., DOMESTIC
CONSEQUENCES OF UNrTED STATES POPULATION CHANGE 59-60 (Comm. Print 1978)
[hereinafter cited as DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. POPULATION CHANGE]. The
Census Bureau derived these estimates from projections based on three different
assumptions of the fertility rate: 2.7, 2.1, and 1.7 children per family. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POPULATION EsTnmATEs AND PRoJECTIoNs,
SmuEs P-25, No. 704, PROJECTIONS OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES:
1977 to 2050, at 1, 14-15 (1977). See DOMEsIC CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. POPULA-
TION CHANGE, supra, at 25-30.
4 The phrase "nursing home" will be used in this Comment as a generic term
encompassing all those institutions that fall within any of the half dozen definitions
used by the federal government. Among those included in the general federal
classification for statistical purposes are: (1) Nursing care homes, whose primary
function is nursing care; (2) Personal care homes with nursing, in which personal
care is the primary function and some nursing is provided; (3) Personal care homes
without nursing, whose sole function is personal care; and (4) Domiciliary care
homes, in which domiciliary care is the primary function but the home has respon-
sibility for providing some personal care. NATIONAL CFNTER FOR HEALTH STA-
TISTICs, OFFICE or HEALTH RESEARCH, STATISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY, PuBLIc HEALTH
SERVICE, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFAnE, HEALTH RESOURCES STA-
TimCS: HEALTH MANPowEm AND HEALTH FAcLrrms 298 (1976-1977) [hereinafter
cited as HEALTH RESOURCES STATISTICS]. For purposes of Medicare and Medicaid
programs, the government certifies skilled nursing facilities, for people who need
constant professional medical attention; for purposes of Medicaid only, it certifies
intermediate care facilities, for people who need less extensive medical supervision.
Id. 299-300. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, OFFICE OF HEALTH
REsEACi, STATISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, THE NATIONAL NuRsING HoME SURvEY: 1977
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homes in 1977 5 at a cost in excess of nine billion dollars.6 Up to
now, too, academicians and government policymakers have focused
their studies of the housing and medical needs of the elderly on
nursing homes 7 and conventional housing.8 An increasingly popu-
lar alternative, a combination housing and nursing-care institution
known as the continuing-care community, has received scant at-
tention.
The continuing-care community provides residential accom-
modations for the elderly, and, when necessary, nursing care in a
specialized facility on the premises. In exchange for this lifetime 9
SUMAY FOR THE UNITED STATES, DHEW PUB. No. (PHS) 79-1794, at 130
(1979) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL NURSING HoME SURVEY].
"The growth of the industry has been impressive. Between 1960 and 1970,
nursing home facilities increased by 140 percent, beds by 232 percent, patients by
210 percent, employees by 405 percent, and expenditures for care by 465 percent.
Measured from 1960 through 1973, expenditures increased almost 1,400 percent."
SENATE SPECIAL COMm. ON AGING, Suncom . ON LONG-TERM CARE, 94TH CONG.,
IST SEss., NURSING HOME CARE IN THE UNrrE STATES: FAILURE IN PUBLIC POLIC
XIII (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 SENATE REPORT]. And one
House of Representatives subcommittee found that "the rate of public spending for
nursing home care has increased virtually faster than for any other health service,"
at an annual rate of more than 23% from 1967 through 1976. HousE CoMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGA-
TIoNs, 95TH CoNG., IsT SEss., REPORT ON FRAUDn AND ABUSE IN NURSING HoMEs:
PHARMACEUTICAL KI=ACK ARRANGEMENTS 1-2 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter
cited as REPORT ON FRAUD AND ABUSE IN NURSING HoMES].
5 NATIONAL NURSING HOME SuRvFy, supra note 4, at 8. Although the 1.3
million people living in nursing homes represent only five percent of the elderly
population, the fact that by 1974 there were more nursing-home beds in the United
States than general hospital and surgical beds demonstrates the importance of the
problems of long-term institutionalization of the elderly. 1975 SENATE REPORT,
supra note 4, at XII.
6 HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, SuBcoMM. ON HEALTH AND LONG-TERm
CARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., NEW PERSPECTrVEs IN HEALTH CARE FOR OLDER
AMERICANS 14 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 HOUSE REPORT].
7 E.g., SENATE SPECIAL CoMm. ON AGING, SUBCoMm. ON LONG-TERM CARE,
93D CONG., IST & 2D SESS., 94TH CoNG., 1ST SEss., NURSING HOME CARE IN THE
UNITED STATES: FAILURE IN PUBLIC POLICY (eight parts) (Comm. Print 1974-1976);
Carlston, Governmental Regulation of Nursing Homes-An Inquiry, 1973 UTAH
L. REv. 270 (1973); Regan, When Nursing Home Patients Complain: The Ombuds-
-man or the Patient Advocate, 65 GEO. L.J. 691 (1977); Symposium, Law and the
Aged, 17 Aiz. L. REv. 267 (1975). On the harms of institutionalization generally,
see Consequences of Changing U.S. Population: Demographics of Aging: Joint
Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Population and the Select Com-
mittee on Aging, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Demographics
of Aging]. For examples of studies of the medical needs of the elderly, see SENATE
SPECIAL CoMM. ON AGING, 91ST CONG., 1sT SEss., HEALTH ASPECTS OF Tim Eco-
NOMICS OF AGING (Comm. Print 1969); Murray & Glassberg, Long-Term Health
Care for the Elderly: The Challenge of the Next Decade, 39 Ar. L. REv. 617
(1975).
s E.g., Adequacy of Federal Response to Housing Needs of Older Americans:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the Elderly of the Senate Special
Comm. on Aging, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (nine parts) (1971-1972).
9 Although the contemplated term of the continuing-care contract is the life of
the resident, each party has certain limited rights of termination. See note 13 infra.
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service, the resident makes a substantial capital contribution to the
community and pays a relatively fixed monthly fee. This arrange-
ment, a modern variation on well-established charitable and often
church-sponsored institutions,"* offers a form of social insurance to
the elderly: it preserves residential independence and removes the
spectre of costly, and often premature, long-term institutionali-
zation.1
This Comment will first describe the modern-form continuing-
care community and the reasons for its growth and increasing popu-
larity. It will then, in part II, focus on those aspects of continuing
care that present significant public-policy concerns and demonstrate
the need for some form of government regulation. Finally, in part
III, the Comment will review the possible governmental responses,
including the current, and largely inadequate, state efforts at regu-
lation. In conjunction with that review, it will suggest a three-
phase regulatory scheme designed to protect the interests of the
elderly without inhibiting the development of continuing care.
Because the modern form of continuing care is a relatively
new development, information about its practical application is not
abundant, nor is there any single sophisticated model that may be
called modern-form continuing care. Therefore, on the basis of
available information and the opinions of people who have had
experience in running continuing-care communities, this Comment
will present a general picture of the institution. Even the broad
survey that is now possible reveals the compelling social advantages
of continuing care and the major potential dangers associated with
it. Especially because more and more people can be expected to
entrust their savings and social well-being to continuing-care com-
munities, it is not too early to suggest the likely targets and broad
outlines of a comprehensive scheme of regulation. At issue is not
merely the financial success of entrepreneurs in a free market, but
the welfare of countless thousands of people who may have staked
all they own on those entrepreneurs' vision of security in old age.
I. THE CONTINUINC-C.ARE PHENOMENON
A. What Is a Modern-Form Continuing-Care Community?
In brief, a modern-form continuing-care community' 2 is a
financially self-sufficient residential community for the elderly that
1o See note 14 infra.
11 See notes 38-44 infra & accompanying text.
12 The chief distinction between the "modem form" and its continuing-care
predecessors is the mode of financing the community. See note 14 infra & accom-
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offers medical and nursing services in specialized facilities on the
premises. Its distinguishing feature-and the basis of its existence
and operations-is a lifetime contract between the community and
each resident that defines each party's financial and service obliga-
tions.13 The resident pays a lump-sum "accommodation fee" prior
to occupancy and a monthly fee thereafter. 14
panying text. It should be noted that the literature, statutes, and case law on this
subject refer to continuing care, life care, perpetual care, residence and care, and
life lease, often interchangeably, and often with the result of no small degree of
confusion. Important distinctions between the terms will be explained as necessary
throughout this Comment. The description that follows in the text sets out the
fundamental definitional features of modem-form continuing care.
13 Several examples of modem-form continuing-care contracts are on file with
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
This Comment refers to the continuing-care contract as a "lifetime" contract in
accordance with the expectations of the parties. In fact, in contrast to the tradi-
tional life-care contract, see note 14 infra, which binds at least the provider for the
life of the resident, the continuing-care contract may be terminated by either the
resident or the community, see notes 108-10 infra & accompanying text.
14 AamucAN AssocrAo N oF HomS FOR THm Acmo, CorrTnmin CARM
HomS 1 (1976). Fees vary greatly from community to community and within
communities. Entrance fees range from $15,000 to $75,000, depending on the
offerings of the particular community, the size of the residential unit, and the type
and relative proportions of expenses that the entrance and monthly fees are de-
signed to cover. Monthly fees may run between $350 and $1500, depending on
the same factors. Interview with Lloyd W. Lewis, Executive Director of Kendal-
Crosslands, in Kennett Square, Pa. (Dec. 3, 1979) (notes on file with the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Interview with Lewis]. See
N. ADmmAN, DrncTony OF LI= CAm Coivnm-rrms (1978).
Most continuing-care communities use one of three methods of financing. The
accommodation-fee-plus-monthly-payments method, in its modem form, is a flexible
one in which, as recommended here, entrance fees are used to cover capital expendi-
tures of the community and monthly fees are tied to current operating costs. See
text following notes 56 & 61 infra. Not all communities that use the accommodation-
fee-plus-monthly-payments method use it in its modem form. See, e.g., text accom-
panying note 88 infra.
Another financing arrangement, now largely of historical interest only, see
Letter from Thomas M. Jenkins, Judge of the Superior Court, County of San Mateo,
California, to the author (Nov. 26, 1979) (on file with the University of Pennsyl-
vania Law Review), has been used primarily by church-affiliated providers. Based
on the sectarian convent tradition according to which the novice "donated" all her
possessions for the support of the convent, C. TowNsEN), OL AGE: TIM LAST
SEGoREGAToN 92 (1971), it requires the resident to assign all his present and
after-acquired assets to the community in exchange for an irrevocable promise of
lifetime care. In this manner, the residents pay what they can afford, and the
total cost for each resident is only incidentally related to the cost of care. Use of
this method always entails the threat of financial disaster because the community
assumes the risks of projecting indeterminate costs and life expectancies: the resident
must be supported for life regardless of the size of his original contribution.
Aauc.N AssocATom oF Hoims FoR TnE AGiNG, supra, at 3. See notes 76-81
infra & accompanying text.
This assignment-of-all-assets arrangement has been sharply criticized because of
the economic hazards to the community, the psychological damage caused by de-
priving people of all their assets, and the incidence of large "contributions" without
commensurate benefit. Jenkins, Life Care Contracts-A Viable Option?, CoNcERN,
Dec. 1975-Jan. 1976, at 35.
The third arrangement is known as the total-fee-in-advance contract, under
which the resident pays a predetermined amount when he enters the facility. The
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The typical contract provides that upon the death of the resi-
dent-whether one day, one year, or a decade after occupancy-the
entrance fee vests in the community, regardless of the value of
services received by the resident.15 The required monthly fee, al-
though based on community operating costs 16 and thus subject to
change, does not increase as a result of a resident's transfer from his
residential cottage (where he is largely self-sufficient) to the nursing
facility (where full nursing care is provided); 17 it is the same for
all residents with comparable housing units. This rate structure is
considered by some experts to be the most crucial element of con-
tinuing care because it transforms the contract into a form of insur-
ance against the high costs of long-term institutionalization. 8
The continuing-care community is a unique response to the
needs of the elderly, but it draws on features of several other hous-
ing and nursing institutions. Like a retirement village, it provides
individual units for its residents in an age-segregated environment,
but the continuing-care residents have no ownership rights in those
units.19 The community offers nursing care on the premises, just
like a traditional nursing home, but unlike in the latter, entry into
the community nursing facility entails no increase in the resident's
cost of living
2 0
fee is based on the estimated cost of services that will be provided during the
resident's life. This arrangement differs from the assignment-of-all-assets method
in that the payment often amounts to less than the residents total assets. Obviously,
its use raises many of the same problems as the assignment-of-all-assets method.
Both methods are potential objects of official disapprobation by the American
Association of Homes for the Aging. Id. 35-36.
15 For example: "At the death of Resident, all Entry Fees, Monthly Bates, and
any other funds deposited with Community under this agreement shall thereupon
and forthwith become the permanent property of Community without any right of
refund." Crosslands Corp., Residence and Care Agreement, f6(c), appended to
Complaint, Mears v. Crosslands Corp., No. 175 (Pa. C.P., Chester County, Oct. 3,
1979) (emphasis deleted). See Jenkins, Life Care Contracts-A Proposed Contract,
Covcm, June-July 1976, at 19, 22.
Such clauses in particular, and contract-termination and refund provisions in
general, have generated a substantial amount of litigation. See notes 108-30 infra
& accompanying text.
1 6 See note 14 supra & text following note 56 infra.
"7Although the text refers to "nursing facility" in the singular, each community
may have, for instance, both an intermediate and a skilled nursing facility. See
note 4 supra. Some communities do not have a facility on the premises at all, but
transfer residents to outside nursing homes when needed, also at no extra charge,
however. N. AnEINN, supra note 14, at 94.
18E.g., Richard W. Stephan, Administrator, Cathedral Village, Philadelphia,
Pa., Presentation at the Continuing Care Seminar, in Valley Forge, Pa. (June 12,
1979) (proceedings on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). See
notes 40-44 infra & accompanying text.
19 See notes 115-16 infra & accompanying text.
2
0 As has been noted, see text accompanying note 16 supra, all residents' fees
may be increased if the overall cost of nursing care to the community goes up, but
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Continuing-care and life-care 21 arrangements are becoming in-
creasingly popular in the United States. In 1976 there were an
estimated three hundred communities. By early 1979 that figure
had doubled to approximately six hundred 2-eighty of which were
sufficiently similar to one community's definition of continuing care
to be included in the industry's first directory of continuing-care
communities.23 Another twenty-five to thirty modern-form con-
tinuing-care communities were in relatively advanced stages of plan-
ning in 1979; thirty to fifty more were in the early planning stages.2
This dramatic growth is attributable to two primary advantages for
elderly, middle-class people: the sociological advantage of inde-
pendent living without the burdens of ownership and the economic
or insurance advantage of relatively fixed fees regardless of the level
of services received.25  The significance of these advantages is dis-
cussed in the following section.
B. Why Continuing Care?
Continuing care is particularly well suited for two groups of
elderly, middle-class people: those who live independently but need
occasional medical or nursing care, and those in nursing homes who
do not need full-time care. This section will survey the demo-
graphic and economic underpinnings of the popularity of continu-
ing care.
The proportion of elderly people in the United States, already
large, will continue to grow steadily until at least 2080.26 During
most of that time, the average age of the elderly population is also
expected to increase dramatically.27 A major factor in these fore-
there is no direct correlation between an individual's fees and his admittance into
the nursing facility.
21 See notes 12-14 supra.
2 2 Frankel, Life Care Communities: Housing for Both the Active and Infirm
Elderly, J. PaoP. MANACEMENT, Mar.-Apr. 1979, at 82. Based on an estimated
average size of 350 residents, Interview with Lewis, supra note 14, life-care and
continuing-care communities thus had approximately 210,000 residents in 1979.
23 This figure includes only communities that intended to offer a "pure" form
of continuing care, as determined by seven criteria: (1) lifetime contract; (2)
medical and nursing care on the premises; (3) accommodation-plus-monthly-fee
financing; (4) financial self-sufficiency; (5) adjustable monthly fees; (6) nonprofit;
and (7) designed for people healthy at entrance. See N. ADELMANN, supra note
14, at 4.
24 Id. 93; Interview with Lewis, supra note 14.
2 5 See notes 40-44 infra & accompanying text.
26 See notes 1 & 3 supra & accompanying text. Predictions such as this are
relatively safe because everyone who will be at least 65 years old some time in the
next 65 years is now living.
27 In 1976, 38% of elderly people were age 75 or older. In 2000, this propor-
tion will reach 45% before falling back to 38% by 2020. Demographics of Aging,
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casts is the general increase in life expectancy in this country: a
child born in 1976 was expected to live seventy-three years, twenty-
six years longer than was a child born in 1900.28 Although the life
expectancy of persons over age seventy-five is also increasing,29 ap-
proximately eighty percent of the overall increase is attributable to
a reduction in mortality among people seventy years old or
younger.3 0
The demand for housing and nursing care among the elderly
is closely related to age, 1 health,8 2 and financial status.33 Since the
supra note 7, at 81-82, 111 (statement of Jacob S. Siegel). See Hyatt, As Lives
Are Extended, Some People Wonder If It's Really a Blessing, Wall St J., Oct 25,
1979, at 1, col. 6.
28 FAcTs ABOUT OLDER AMrICAzNS, supra note 1.
29 In 1976 a 75-year-old had a life expectancy of 10.1 year and an 80-year-old
a life expectancy of 7.9 years. The comparable figures in 1900 were 7.08 and 5.30,
respectively. NATIONAL CENTE FOr HEAT STATISTICS, PUBLIC HEALTH SEavicE,
DEP'T oF HEALTH, EDucATIoN, AND WELFAm, FActs oF LWE An DE-ATH, DHEW
PuB. No. (PHS) 79-1222, at 6 (1978). This statistic is most important to a con-
tinuing-care operator because life expectancy at time of entry is a key variable used
in the setting of rates. See notes 76-79 infra & accompanying text.
30V. Fucns, WHo SHr LrvE? 40 (1974).
3 1 See DomEsTIc CONSEQUENCES or U.S. POPULATION CHANGE, supra note 3,
at 62. For instance, in 1974, 12 of every 1,000 people between the ages of 65 and
74 were residents of nursing homes, compared to 237 of every 1,000 people over
age 85. Demographics of Aging, supra note 7, at 127 (statement of Mary Grace
Kovar). In general, people over age 65 require twice the health care that those
under that age do. M. MmmELsoN, TmDER Lov-nre GREED 35 (1974).
32 In 1976, chronic ailments limited the abilities of 39% of the elderly to work
or keep house; only seven percent of people under 65 were so limited. People over
65 are more likely to visit a doctor or hospital, do so more frequently, and stay
longer in the hospital. Thus, it is not surprising that the per capita cost of health
care for elderly people in 1976 was $1,521, nearly three times the $547 for those
younger than 65. FACTs ABOUT OLDER AmERICANs, supra note 1.
33 The typical person over 65 is in a precarious financial position. The median
income of families headed by an elderly person in 1969 ($4,985) was only half the
median income for all families in the United States ($9,596). Older persons not
living in families had a median income of only $1,813 for the year. BUREAu oF
THE CENsUs, DEP'T oF ComaonmCE, WE: THE AMERIcAN ELDERLY 12 (1973). For
many elderly people, this income is fixed, and, although perhaps sufficient to meet
usual day-to-day expenses, cannot cover the costs of long-term institutionalization.
Jenkins, supra note 14, at 35, 36.
Of the 20 million persons 65 and older in 1970, 4.8 million had incomes below
the poverty level Two million more could not afford the cost of necessary medical
care. Only two million of these seven million were receiving aid under federal
old-age assistance programs. Fewer than half the elderly people who were eligible
actually received Medicaid, which is available only to qualified needy individuals.
For many, the co-insurance and deductible features of Medicaid are often oppressive.
C. TowNsEND, supra note 14, at 19-20.
For those elderly persons who fail to qualify for Medicaid, there is no govern-
mental assistance for intermediate nursing care. See note 4 supra; REPoRT o N
FRtuD AND ABUSE iN Nutnsnc HoMES, supra note 4, at 7-12. Coverage for long-
term institutionalization is sharply limited under Medicare to 100 days per "benefit
period." A benefit period begins upon entry to a hospital or nursing home and
terminates after the individual has been out of the institution for 60 consecutive
days. This benefit is available only after the patient has been hospitalized for at
19801
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early part of this century, middle-class elderly people have tended
to live independently for as long as possible and then, as their health
and financial condition deteriorated, to move to an apartment or
room in a retirement home or the home of an adult child, and then
to an institution.34 But because of the shortage of appropriate
housing, the general increase in mobility of the population, the rise
of the two-worker family, and, perhaps most important, the enact-
ment of Medicare and Medicaid programs,85 that historical pattern
is showing signs of changing.36
In 1980, more and more people who are at all financially and
physically able to do so are holding on to their houses or apartments
longer.3 7 Many others, faced with failing health and dwindling
financial resources, find they must move to nursing homes before
long-term institutionalization is really necessary or desirable. In
fact, it has been estimated that 2.4 million elderly people who are
not in need of long-term institutionalization do need some form of
housing/nursing-service plan to avoid a premature move to nursing
homes.38 And surveys in three states have indicated that from fifty-
three to as much as ninety percent of residents of long-term nursing
facilities did not require such extensive care.39 As the overall num-
ber and average age of elderly people increase, these two groups can
be expected to grow as well.
Continuing-care communities offer such people significant ad-
vantages over their present situations and over other forms of con-
least three days and has transferred to a skilled nursing facility within 14 days of
discharge. Even then a co-payment is required for the last 80 days. Id. 8. For
the middle class, therefore, Medicare provides little assistance in the long run because
the program is designed more for rehabilitation after hospitalization than for long-
term institutionalization. Finally, health insurance rarely covers long-term nursing
care. M. MFNDELSON, supra note 31, at 35.
34 Do Esrc CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. POPULATION CH-ANGE, supra note 3, at 62.
35 See HEALTH REsOURCES STATiSTCs, supra note 4, at 327; Demographics of
Aging, supra note 7, at 12 (testimony of Tamara Hareven), 15 (testimony of Beth
J. Soldo), 21 (testimony of Tamara Hareven); Phila. Inquirer, Dec. 16, 1979, § L,
at 1, col. 1.
36 This trend has manifested itself primarily in three ways: (1) a shift in the
institutionalized population from mental and other inappropriate facilities to nursing
homes; (2) a decline in the number of multigenerational households; and (3) a
decline in the incidence of strangers living in others' households. DovinsTic CON-
SEQUENCES OF U.S. PoPuLA iON CHANGE, supra note 3, at 62-63; see Demographics
of Aging, supra note 7, at 217-20 (statement of Beth J. Soldo). See generally
M. MENDELSON, supra note 31, at 34-39; W. THmAs, NursiNr, HomEs AND PUBLIC
PoLICY (1969); C. TOwNsEND, supra note 14.
38 Carp, The Concept and Role of Congregate Housing for Older People, in
CONGREGATE HoUSING FOR OLDER PEOPIE 3, 6 (W. Donahue, M. Thompson, &
D. Curren eds. 1977).
3 9 M. MENDELSON, supra note 31, at 40-41. The three states were Michigan,
New York, and Ohio.
37 See note 36 supra.
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gregate housing arrangements. Unlike any nursing home, con-'
dominium, or retirement village, the communities preserve the
incidents of independent living, without the burdens of ownership
and without sacrificing affordable and readily available nursing
care.40 The most significant advantage of continuing care for the
middle class, however, lies in the structure and amount of residents'
payments: a substantial entrance fee plus moderate and relatively
fixed monthly payments. Because most elderly people own their
own homes 41 and may have other capital assets such as stocks and
bonds, they have the means to raise sufficient cash for the entrance
fee. In return for liquidating what may be their entire financial
bases, they are guaranteed lifetime housing and nursing care at
relatively fixed rates that correspond to what for many are fixed
incomes.42 This arrangement not only offers the long-term security
many elderly people lack,48 but also ensures that long-term nursing
care will be within their financial means 44-and without unneces-
sary loss of independence or unnecessary institutionalization.
40 See N. ADELmANN, supra note 14, at 4; Frankel, supra note 22, at 82-84.
It is not inconceivable that, in addition, the continuing-care contract may create
enforceable standards for quality of care. See Brown, An Appraisal of the Nursing
Home Enforcement Process, 17 Amuz. L. REv. 304, 350-51 (1975). But see
C. TowNsEND, supra note 14, at 93-94.
41 Eighty-two percent of elderly heads of households and 59% of elderly persons
living alone own their own homes. The median value of the housing units owned
by elderly people in 1976 was over $25,000. FACTS ABOUT OLDER AwM cANS,
supra note 1.
42 See notes 16-20 & 33 supra & accompanying text. Some numbers, based on
those in papers filed in a New Jersey suit by heirs of a resident, may help illustrate
this relationship. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment at 6-7, exh. D, Smith v. Estaugh, No. 75-1996 (D.N.J. Oct. 13, 1976).
Before entering the community, the resident converted his house, stocks, and bonds
into $73,000 in cash. He had annual interest income of $6,000, social security
income of $2,700, and pension income of $5,500, a total of just over $14,000 a
year. He paid an entrance fee of $15,000 to the community out of the cash derived
from his capital assets; his monthly fee was $300. When the resident had to move
into the community's nursing facility, he continued to pay $300 per month. The
monthly rate at an equivalent skilled nursing facility would have been $1,500.
Thus, whereas the resident could easily afford the costs of continuing care, entrance
into an independent skilled nursing facility would have threatened to consume his
capital assets.
The continuing-care form allows spreading of costs and cross-subsidization. The
spreading is achieved when residents do not live as long as expected: their prepaid
funds may be used to pay the costs of caring for residents who live longer than
expected and who might run out of money. Cross-subsidization among residents
occurs because people who buy more spacious or luxurious housing units pay higher
fees for the same care than do people who buy smaller units.
43S. DE BzAsvoni, THE Comusc or AGE 699 (P. O'Brian transl. 1970).
Elderly middle-class people who neither qualify for Medicaid nor have health insur-
ance to finance long-term institutionalization have good reason to feel less than
secure. See note 33 supra & accompanying text.
44 See note 33 supra.
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The correspondence between the structure of continuing-care
communities and the financial and social needs of the elderly has
led some housing experts to predict that these communities will
supplant "retirement" condominium housing to a large extent and
take over a "substantial portion" of the market in housing for the
elderly.
45
II. THE BAsis FOR REGULATION
The need for specific regulation tailored to continuing care
arises from the distinctive financial and contractual nature of the
institution. This part will attempt to elaborate the basic justifica-
tions for such regulation. As will be seen in the references to the
dramatic bankruptcy of Pacific Homes, these justifications are by
no means merely hypothetical.
46
A few general considerations should be noted first. The model
of continuing care described in the preceding part is just that-a
model. But, for a variety of reasons discussed below, even good
intentions may not ensure that the reality of continuing care con-
forms to this Comment's paradigmatic well-run community. Be-
cause even apparently minor miscalculations or variations from that
model can be catastrophic, the need for regulation is even more
pressing in such nonconforming communities.
Moreover, proprietary operators are entering the continuing-
care field in ever-increasing numbers.4 7 The development of the
flexible modern-form financing method has mitigated some of the
risks that traditionally have made life care the province of charitable
organizations.4 But, as has been demonstrated in the case of nurs-
ing homes,49 the mechanisms of a free market are inadequate to en-
sure that high-quality nursing care will be provided.50
45 Frankel, supra note 22, at 84; Demographics of Aging, supra note 7, at 60
(statement of Dr. Donald Cowgill); Address by Gerard V. Carey, Chairman of Life
Services Corp., remarks noted in The Bulletin, Jan. 27, 1980, § H, at 2, col. 6
(Philadelphia).
46 See notes 85-96 infra & accompanying text.
47 See Frankel, supra note 22, at 82.
48 See note 14 supra.
49 See Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 863-65
(1980).
50 Id. For this reason, a Federal Trade Commission program advisor has
argued that current regulation of nursing homes is inadequate. Elizabeth A. Taylor,
Address Before the American Association of Homes for the Aging's 7th Annual
Government Affairs Workshop, in Washington, D.C. (March 30, 1979) (copy on




A. Financing Continuing Care
The intricacies of initial and year-to-year financing of a con-
tinuing-care community pose the most significant challenge to the
operators and the greatest threat to the welfare of the residents.
The following explanation of alternative ways to finance a con-
tinuing-care community is offered in an attempt to illustrate the
challenge and lay the foundation for the discussions of fraud and
mismanagement in the next two sections.
Initial financing may be obtained in one of two ways. The
community can issue bonds to finance the purchase of land and
construction of facilities, or it can borrow money and mortgage its
property. When bonds are used, construction costs not covered by
the bond issue and interest and principal payments on the bonds
are financed primarily through entrance fees, which are set accord-
ingly. Operating costs and the remaining portion of the capital
debt are then met with the revenue from future entrance fees and
from monthly fees, which are based on the health and projected
life expectancy of the average resident.51 The faster an institution
retires its bonds, of course, the greater the initial financial burden
on the first residents.
Ideally, mortgage financing should work in a similar fashion,
with entrance fees set to cover the difference between the cost of
the project and the amount of the permanent mortgage. Again,
because excessive reliance on the initial residents' payments would
be unfair, the permanent mortgage is often used to cover between
thirty and sixty percent of the project cost
5 2
The long-term financial success of any continuing-care com-
munity is critically dependent on the turnover of residents. Perma-
nent transfer of a resident to the nursing facility 53 frees a residential
unit which can be used to generate a new entrance fee. And the
death of a resident frees the remainder of his entrance payment for
unrestricted use by the community.5 4 Obviously, if the resident
51 See Preliminary official Statement for Paul's Run Lifecare Community Bond
Offering by Philadelphia Authority for Industrial Development (July 27, 1979);
Interview with Ray H. Hartman, Executive Director, Lutheran Children and Family
Service, in Philadelphia, Pa. (Nov. 29, 1979) (notes on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Interview with Hartman].
52 See Interview with Lewis, supra note 14.
53A permanent move to the nursing facility is made when the community and
the resident decide it is in the residents best interest. Even if a permanent transfer
is agreed upon, the resident retains his contractual right to a housing unit should he
recover.
54The status of a resident's entrance payment both before and after his death-
including any right to a refund-is a matter of contract. See note 15 supra; notes
111 & 127-30 infra & accompanying text. The idea that a residents payment may
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had not yet made a permanent move to the nursing facility, his
death means a new resident may be admitted-and a new entrance
fee paid. In fact, all communities fix their fees on the basis of an
assumed rate of turnover. 5 In the early years, therefore, and in
any other year when turnover is lower than expected, the commu-
nity will have a shortfall in revenues. For this reason, well-run
communities voluntarily establish significant cash or other liquid
reserves which may be drawn on to counteract a shortfall. 6
Communities may rely to differing extents on the accommoda-
tion (or entrance) and monthly fees to pay operating expenses.
Some prefer large accommodation fees and lower monthly fees; they
put significant portions of the accommodation fees in reserve, to be
"earned" each year and used with the monthly fees. Others place
primary reliance on monthly fees for operating revenues. Both
entrance and monthly fees may be altered over time,r7 but the better
-and more difficult-practice is to keep them relatively level. Keep-
ing fees level eliminates the potential unfairness to early residents
described above and avoids disruption of residents' financial plans. 53
(For instance, a community with a high entrance fee and a relatively
low monthly charge may attract residents with substantial fixed
assets and low expected income; one with a low entrance fee and
higher monthly fees may attract people without a ready source of
cash but with higher expected income. In the former case, a change
to significantly higher monthly fees could cause serious difficulties
for residents.)
Fee-setting decisions turn on a number of factors. The high
entrance fee emphasizes the insurance aspects of continuing care; r9
the high monthly fee, on the other hand, offers the community the
advantage of greater financial flexibility. If a community using the
former approach miscalculates the entrance fee for its first residents,
it will face the possibility of having to increase monthly fees sub-
stantially, and, because its residents are likely to have only moderate
be spent only for care of that resident has its adherents, but it is inconsistent with
the concept of modem-form continuing care. See Jenkins, Life Care Contracts-
Problems?, CONCERN, Feb.-Mar. 1976, at 27, 30.
55 An assumed annual turnover rate of eight percent is commonly used. See
Interview with Lewis, supra note 14.
56 See Kendal-Crosslands Annual Report for the Year April 1, 1978 to March
31, 1979, at 7-9; Interview with Hartman, supra note 51.
57 See note 14 supra.
58 See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra; notes 33 & 42 supra. Keeping
fees relatively level is in the community's interest as well: residents' financial
troubles can easily become revenue problems for the community as a whole.
59 See notes 18 & 42 supra & accompanying text.
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income, financial collapse may ensue. ° A miscalculation in any
one year by a community with low entrance fees, however, is more
easily overcome through reliance on cash reserves in the short run
and slightly increased monthly fees in the long run.
Communities must also take account of the relation between
the size of the entrance fee and their estimate of the community's
turnover rate. Because higher entrance fees are more likely to be
paid only by people who expect to live longer, mortality estimates
must be adjusted accordingly-which may force a community to
raise the initial fee even more to cover expenses over the longer
term.
A final complicating factor is that, in general, monthly fees will
be higher in absolute terms in communities with low entrance fees,
and one of the hallmarks of modern-form continuing care is a
monthly payment affordable by people with only moderate income.
6 1
The fee-setting decision of a community is thus complex and
critical. A rough rule of thumb that strikes a balance between "in-
surance" and low monthly fees on the one hand and financial
stability on the other hand is that the provider (1) should set its
entrance fees to cover capital expenditures, debt service, and depre-
ciation and (2) should attempt to match its adjustable monthly fees
to its estimated operating expenses.
B. Potential for Fraud
One significant consequence of the entrance-fee financing dis-
cussed above 62 is that a continuing-care provider may have as much
as seven to twelve million dollars at its disposal before the com-
munity's doors ever open.6 3 Even after operations are underway,
entrance prepayments continue to come in.64 Those entrance fees
are not merely investors' spare dollars, but substantial down pay-
ments on security in old age. The possibility that care providers
will have control of sums of this size and character fairly cries out
for protective regulation.
Although there have been no known instances of fraudulent
diversions of entrance fees, examples of fraud in nursing-home
operations offer instructive examples of the great potential for
60 See notes 85-96 infra & accompanying text.
61 See note 33 supra; notes 40-44 supra & accompanying text.
62 See notes 51-52 supra & accompanying text.
63 See notes 14 & 22 supra.
64 Once a community retires its initial capital debt, the entrance payments it
accumulates for repair and reconstruction are beyond even the nominal control of
any outside entity-absent state regulation.
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abuse.65 Residents of any kind of nursing facility are not likely to
be capable of keeping tabs on management,6 6 and so are particularly
vulnerable to fraud. And, unlike nursing-home residents, continu-
ing-care residents are likely to have a difficult time leaving the
facility for another one.
Annual revenues of nursing homes totaled approximately five
hundred million dollars in 1960. By 1978, revenues had increased
to a staggering fourteen billion dollars-a three thousand percent
increase.6 7 The presence of such sums has spawned a great many
fraudulent practices: kickback schemes,6 self-dealing,69 complicated
sale/leaseback transactions to raise government reimbursement
levels,70 and padding of bills 71 are among the more commonly docu-
mented nursing-home frauds.
Two more sophisticated and even more profitable schemes-
stock-market and mortgage manipulations-are used to generate
65 The analogy to nursing homes is especially significant in light of the growing
presence of proprietary operators in the continuing-care field. See notes 47-50
supra & accompanying text; see also note 90 infra.
66 See note 49 supra & accompanying text.
67 Taylor, Address, supra note 50. The federal and state governments provide
more than 70% of nursing-home revenue. Id.
68 Id. Nursing-home providers not only have little incentive to select suppliers
with the lowest prices (because they pass on these expenses to the residents or the
government) but also may find it in their best interest to deal with high-price
retailers who agree to kick back a portion of the inflated price to the unscrupulous
provider. Id.
69 See M. MENDELSON, supra note 31; C. TOWNSEND, supra note 14, at 96-99.
Self-dealing allows a provider-retailer to inflate the costs of ancillary services and
products. One new phenomenon in the nursing-home industry is the rise of the
vertically integrated chain operator. See C. TowNsEND, supra note 14, at 96-99.
Such chain operators own not only several nursing homes but also pharmaceutical
companies, management firms, and equipment manufacturing companies, all of which
sell their goods and services to the nursing homes at excessive prices. See generally
M. MENDELSON, supra note 31. This practice is especially effective when the nursing
homes are "nonprofit" because it allows the operator to shift "profits" out of the
nursing homes to his own profit-making businesses. See note 183 infra.
The Federal Trade Commission has documented several examples of this type
of fraud. One nursing-home chain recently purchased its own pharmacy. The
prices for its drugs immediately shot up 40%. Another group of nursing-home in-
vestors sold used equipment to the homes they owned at prices more than twice
book value and 86% above cost And one nursing home reportedly had entered into
management contracts with investors or outsiders "which offer little in the way of
services." Taylor, Address, supra note 50.
70 M. MEND=LSON, supra note 31, at 105-15; Taylor, Address, supra note 50.
In one popular scheme, the owner sells his nursing home to his own company,
which then leases it back to the operator at an exorbitant rent Medicaid and
Medicare reimbursements-whether based on the cost-plus or flat-rate method, see
42 C.F.R. §§ 405.401-.455, 447.250-.371 (1979)-will then rise accordingly, even
though there has been no real change in the home's financial position. The Federal
Trade Commission has documented one sale/leaseback scheme in which a nursing
home doubled its rental rates. Taylor, Address, supra note 50.
71 Padding of bills has been estimated to cost almost $800 million per year in
the Medicaid program alone. M. MENDELsoN, supra note 31, at 79-80.
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large amounts of unencumbered cash that may be used for the
operator's own purposes.72 In the former, the operator lures in-
vestors with the prospect of a share in government-subsidized
profits.73 In the latter, operators have been known to borrow
against future revenues guaranteed by the government at interest
rates of up to forty percent.74
The continuing-care provider need not resort to such schemes
to generate cash-the residents themselves provide it through their
entrance payments, and usually without any form of government
supervision. When this money is siphoned off for the operator's
own use, the losers are not the investors and the government, but
residents of the community, who are left with diminished resources
for vital services. If the dissipation of cash reserves leads to the
collapse of the community-as it undoubtedly must 75-those people
could be left without money, housing, or needed medical care.
C. Potential for Mismanagement
The unique financial dynamics of a continuing-care community
make it particularly vulnerable to quite innocent miscalculations.
Because the possibility of such errors is far from remote, and be-
cause the resultant danger to residents is the same as, if not worse
than, that posed by fraud, regulation should be designed to safe-
guard against the following types of critical mistakes.
First, mistaken demographic predictions can be disastr6us for a
community: its entire rate structure is based on revenue projections
that assume a predetermined turnover of residents.7 6  Miscalcula-
tions of turnover rate occur through failure to predict changes in
mortality rates accurately and/or through use of inappropriate
mortality tables. The inherent fallibility of mortality predictions
has been made quite clear in just the last decade by an unforeseen
one-year increase in the life expectancy of people over age sixty-
five.1 7 But some communities have also made the wholly avoidable
72 For examples of such diversion of funds, see M. MENDELSoN, supra note 31,
at 48-49, 157, 159, 169.
73 See id. 157-59.
74 See id. 29, 48-49.
75 See notes 89-91 infra & accompanying text.
76 See notes 55-56 supra & accompanying text. This is not a problem for
traditional nursing homes because each patient (or the government) pays his own
way each month. There is no dependency on prepaid fees.
The possibility of error in demographic projections is another reason for
reasonably heavy reliance on the more flexible monthly fees to cover operating
expenses. See text following note 61 supra.
77 DoM.s mc CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. PopuLA=rN CHNGE, supra note 3, at 66.
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error of using life insurance, or general, mortality tables instead of
annuity, or adjusted, tables.7 8 The adjusted tables reflect mortality
rates among people who tend to be healthier and wealthier-and so
likely to live longer-than the average American described in the
general tables.7 9 Use of the latter is less likely to yield the appro-
priately conservative estimate of mortality among the middle-class
population of a continuing-care community. It is more likely to
lead to overestimation of the turnover rate and establishment of
lower fees than are conducive to long-term financial stability.
Second, no sound actuarial method has yet been developed for
evaluating simple health-risk factors inherent in continuing care.
When a continuing-care community opens its doors, its population
is relatively healthy and its current costs of health care are known,
and relatively low. In such circumstances, the accumulation of large
entrance-fee funds may create what is called "cash-flow euphoria." 80
But the temptation to overspend in the early years must be overcome
because, as the years pass, nursing costs will increase unpredictably;
as the health of the population deteriorates further, even more-and
more expensive-nursing services must be provided. Moreover, the
incomes of the residents may be eroded over time, limiting the
ability of the community to compensate through increases in the
monthly fee.8' Avoidance of the temptation to overspend may not
be left to chance; some mandatory protections are necessary to pro-
tect the resident population.
Third, and related to both of the previous factors, is the pos-
sibility of excessive reliance on entrance fees for operating revenue
78 See Interview with Hartman, supra note 51.
79 Id.; Interview with Dr. Michael Teitelbaum, Program Officer, The Ford
Foundation, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 6, 1979) (notes on file with the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review). General mortality tables are based on past mortality
rates; in a time of increasing life expectancy, therefore, they are very conservative-
and their use is profitable for life insurance companies. But use of general tables
would be disastrous for annuity companies or continuing-care communities, which
have to pay as long as a person lives, not when he dies. Id.
80 J. Emerson Hartzler, Partner, Touche-Ross & Co., Kansas City, Mo., Presenta-
tion at the Continuing Care Seminar, in Valley Forge, Pa. (June 13, 1979) (pro-
ceedings on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
81 See notes 58-60 supra & accompanying text. Dr. Donald Cowgill has con-
cluded that:
[Aiil of these risks indicate that planning in such places must be very
careful and because there is risk not only of miscalculation but of inten-
tional fraud, they must be regulated not only to guarantee quality of
service but also sound financial management. Furthermore, it seems to me
that the risk factors here are comparable to pension funds, and there is a
need for governmental guarantees of the same kind that were instituted
about a year ago for pension funds.
Demographics of Aging, supra note 7, at 60 (statement of Dr. Donald Cowgill).
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coupled with an inability and/or an unwillingness to raise monthly
rates at the first signs of financial trouble. This possibility is most
pronounced in communities that still use assignment-of-all-assets or
total-fee-in-advance financing.82 It is also a problem for communi-
ties with contracts that provide that the monthly fee may not be
raised at all during the life of the resident 83 or that expressly limit
the rate of increase.84 When financial difficulties strike a continuing-
care community-either as a result of fraud, inaccurate actuarial
projections, or submission to cash-flow euphoria-and it either can-
not or will not raise its monthly fees quickly enough to make ends
meet, the result is financial disaster.
D. The Pacific Homes Bankruptcy: A Case in Point
Information about continuing-care communities that have
failed is generally scarce,w but one of the most spectacular failures
of a life-care community, the Pacific Homes bankruptcy, is quite
well-documented.8 6 A brief examination of Pacific Homes's financial
troubles will illustrate the theories of the preceding sections of this
Comment; it is especially instructive because Pacific Homes is a
California corporation operating communities primarily in Cali-
fornia and Arizona, states which extensively regulate continuing-
care communities.
8 7
82 See note 14 supra.
8
3 R. MATTnEws, REPORT oF Tim TRus=T oF PAcIc HomES 1 et seq. (Oct.
15, 1979) [hereinafter cited as PAcIFC Hom:Es BAx:RUP2XY REPoRT].
84 Jenkins, supra note 54, at 29. Restrictions on increases in monthly fees may
also be imposed by state legislation. Id.
85 For example, inadequate information exists to analyze the failures of the
John Knox Retirement Village in Missouri, Baptist homes in Michigan and Florida,
Presbyterian homes in New Jersey, a community operated by a synod of the
Lutheran Church in Indiana, and the Cope United Methodist and the Brethren's
homes in Ohio. See Letter from Toba Feldman, Assistant Attorney General of the
State of Ohio, to the author (Dec. 11, 1979) (on file with the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review); Letter from Gregg A. Johnson, Esq. to the author (Nov. 30,
1979) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). See also
Montgomery, Predators Find Elderly Are Often Easy Prey For Array of Rip-Offs,
Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1979, at 1, col. 6, at 28, col. 3.
8 6 E.g., PACIFc HoMEs BANiRupTcy REPORT, supra note 83; Berman, The
Methodists and Mammon, FonHEs, Dec. 25, 1978, at 25; Montgomery, supra note
85. The Pacific Homes fiasco has resulted in three lawsuits: Trigg v. Pacific Meth-
odist Investment Fund, No. 78-0198-S (S.D. Cal., filed Aug. 21, 1978) (class action
on behalf of purchasers of bonds); Barr v. Methodist Church, No. 404611 (Cal.
Super. Ct., filed July 20, 1979) (class action on behalf of residents for breach of
contract and fraud); Barr v. State, No. 413987 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed Mar. 30,
1978) (class action on behalf of residents against California for failing to enforce
diligently state life-care regulations). See Letter from Gregg A. Johnson, Esq. to
the author (Nov. 30, 1979) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review).
87 See part III C infra.
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Most of the Pacific Homes contracts with residents were either
total-fee-in-advance, assignment-of-all-assets, or accommodation-fee-
plus-fixed-monthly-fee. 88 When operating costs began to outstrip
revenues as a result of inflation, the deteriorating health of residents,
and unexpectedly low mortality rates, the inflexibility of the rate
structure forced Pacific Homes into financial chaos and, finally,
bankruptcy.8 9 As early as 1950, the corporation began to draw on
its accumulated cash reserves to make up annual operating deficits. 90
As a result, by 1954 those reserves dropped below the level con-
sidered sufficient by Pacific Homes's own accountants and that
required by California law.91 In later years, the company resorted
to borrowing from institutions and individuals.
9 2
Pacific Homes's most dangerous response to its difficulties, how-
ever, was expansion.93 Because of the importance of entrance fees
to communities with inflexible fee structures,9 4 the inherent tempta-
tion to cure financial ills by generating new entrance fees is all but
irresistible. Short of killing off residents,95 the only way to generate
entrance fees is to expand and take in new residents. But expan-
sion without a change in rate structure only leads to increased
operating costs and larger deficits, creating the need for ever-further
expansion to produce even more funds. Like any "Ponzi scheme," 96
such a financial structure must eventually collapse of its own weight.
In 1977, this is precisely what happened to Pacific Homes.
88 See note 14 supra.
8 9 PAcFc Homms B..r'rurcy PEPovr, supra note 83, at 1-3, passim. See
Interview with Hartman, supra note 51; notes 76-84 supra & accompanying text.
90 An indication that continuing-care operations are no less vulnerable to fraud
than traditional nursing homes, see notes 65-74 supra & accompanying text, is the
apparently intentional cover-up of these financial machinations by Pacific Homes.
PAcIFc Housa BAmupTcy REPORT, supra note 83, at 16-17, 24, 33, 36, 44-45,
47, 49-51. In addition, the trustee in bankruptcy alleged that the operator of
Pacific Homes fraudulently and negligently used life-care funds for ill-advised and
only marginally related investments in much the same way as its counterparts in
traditional nursing homes have done. Id.
91 Id. 18-21, 33, passim. See notes 194-95 infra & accompanying text.
9 2 PACn C HocEs BANxmurTcy REPoirr, supra note 83, at 18-21, 40-41, 47-49,
53-55.
93 Id. 24, 29-31, passim.
94 See notes 14, 59-60, & 82-84 supra & accompanying text.
95 For a discussion of continuing-care operators' disincentive to care for resi-
dents in times of community financial trouble, see note 142 infra & accompanying
text.
96 A "Ponzi" scheme is a fundamental type of fraud. It is based on taking
money from investors on the promise of repaying huge returns and then
paying off early investors with funds taken in from more recent investors.
The scheme eventually collapses when not enough new investors are found
to cover payments due.
PAcIFIc Homms BANxarupTcY REPoRT, supra note 83, at 1 n.1.
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The Pacific Homes demise is but one example of the many
ways in which fraud or simple errors in judgment can be disastrous
for a continuing-care community and its residents-people who may
have pauperized themselves to secure what they expected to be life-
time care. The lesson is clear: if hundreds of thousands of our
nation's elderly citizens contract for lifetime care, and if risks in-
trinsic in continuing-care operations make financial collapse a real
possibility, then government must protect the operators against
themselves in order to safeguard the welfare of their residents. Just
what form that protection should take is the subject of the follow-
ing part.
III. THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF THE REGULATORY RESPONSE
The overriding purpose of any government regulation of con-
tinuing-care communities must be to ensure their financial integrity:
financial failure poses the greatest threat to the financial and social
well-being of the residents. In particular, regulation must provide
the safeguards that individual residents cannot against fraudulent
dissipation of entrance fees, miscalculations of life expectancy and
resident-turnover rates, poor financial planning, excessive reliance
on rigid entrance-fee financing, and Ponzi-scheme expansion.
Having identified the potential dangers inherent in continuing-
care operations, this Comment now turns to an exploration of the
possible regulatory responses. This part, divided for convenience
according to the degree of regulatory intrusiveness, addresses three
related questions: (1) What have the federal and state governments
already done? (2) What alternative courses of action are open to
them? (3) What are the essential elements of an economical and
efficient regulatory scheme?
A. Inaction and Prohibition
It should be dear by this point that a policy of either prohibi-
tion or total nonregulation of continuing-care communities is un-
acceptable. Yet the federal government has done little more than
show its awareness of continuing care, and forty states and the
District of Columbia have made no attempt to regulate the industry
at all. Two states have apparently attempted without success to
prohibit continuing care.
97
9 7 See notes 165-71 infra & accompanying text.
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1. The Federal Government
With the exception of standard Medicare and Medicaid certifi-
cation regulation for nursing facilities in continuing-care commu-
nities,98 the federal presence in the field is virtually nonexistent.
Several congressional committees have expressed interest in the
problems of continuing care, but none has yet addressed them. 9
In 1977, Representatives William Cohen and Gladys Spellman in-
troduced legislation that would have required continuing-care pro-
viders subject to federal jurisdiction to disclose financial information
to all current and prospective residents and to maintain minimum
cash reserves. 100 The bill died without a day of hearings at the end
of the Ninety-Fifth Congress and has not been reintroduced.' 0 '
The Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Administration on Aging, the National Institute
on Aging, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development
have all also expressed interest in continuing care-also without
98 See note 4 supra.
9 9 Compare Demographics of Aging, supra note 7, at 60 (problems of con-
tinuing care highlighted by Dr. Donald Cowgill) with DoMEsTIc CONSEQUENCES
OF U.S. PoPuLATiON CHANG, supra note 3 (in which the subject was ignored).
See Laurence F. Lane, Director for Public Policy, American Association of Homes
for the Aging, Presentation at Continuing Care Seminar, Valley Forge, Pa. (June
12, 1979) (proceedings on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review);
Letter from E. Bentley Lipscomb, Staff Director, Senate Special Committee on
Aging, to the author (Dec. 14, 1979) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review).
100H.R. 4170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The bill provided that no
federally assisted continuing-care institution could require any prepayment of fees
except under a written contract that met the bill's requirements. Id. §f2(a).
The term "federally assisted continuing care institution" was defined to include
communities that offered long-term care to the elderly and either engaged in
interstate commerce, received Medicaid or Medicare reimbursement, or were con-
structed with federal assistance. Id. § 2(b).
The bill required that the contract between the community and the resident:
(1) provide for full written financial disclosure; (2) include a full description of
charges and services; (3) make clear that the contract granted no property rights;
(4) contain assurances that all fees would be spent on patient care and related
expenses; (5) specify termination conditions, including a requirement that termina-
tion be allowable on 90 days' notice; and (6) provide for an annual audit.
Id. §3, 4.
The bill provided that each community had to maintain "financial reserves
sufficient to meet its obligations" without any further definition. Id. § 5(a).
Payments to facilities under construction would have to have been held in escrow.
Id. § 5(b). The bill also permitted the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare to waive its terms in states that had regulations at least as stringent as
those in the bill. Id. § 8.
For a full discussion of provisions such as those in H.R. 4170, see part
IIIC infra.
101 Laurence F. Lane, Director for Public Policy, American Association of
Homes for the Aging, Presentation at Continuing Care Seminar, Valley Forge, Pa.




tangible result.10 2 For example, the Federal Trade Commission has
concluded that continuing-care institutions are sufficiently different
from traditional nursing homes to justify their exclusion from the
scope of a current investigation of nursing homes. 103 Whether a
separate investigation of continuing care will be conducted is not
yet known.104
At best, federal inattention to continuing care has had a neutral
impact; at worst, it has actually contributed to the problems of
continuing care. 05
2. State Inaction and Reliance on the Judiciary
The dearth of state regulation noted above dearly is not a re-
sult of lack of interest in the problems of the elderly: all fifty states
and the District of Columbia require the licensing of traditional
nursing homes. In fact, the fifty-four state agencies charged with
regulation of nursing homes constitute the largest contingent of
such agencies in the entire field of health-care regulation.0 6
Abdication of responsibility for continuing care by state legis-
lative and executive branches has forced many states' courts into
the business of regulation. But judicial oversight through private
litigation is not the answer to the problems of continuing care.
Private litigation, by its nature, tends to occur after the damage
has been done-damage that in the case of continuing care will often
be irreparable. No judicial mechanism exists to head off the
dangers discussed in this Comment. More particularly, the state
courts have shown, and at times declared, themselves incapable of
taking a broad view of continuing care in individual cases.
The bulk of the litigation involving continuing-care commu-
nities has focused on the relatively narrow issues of contract termi-
102 See id.
103 Telephone interview with Elizabeth A. Taylor, Program Advisor, Federal
Trade Commission (Dec. 17, 1979) (notes on file with the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review).
104 Id.
105 Federal inactivity arguably contributes to the problems of the continuing-
care industry in two ways. First, the federal government has taken such an active
role in nursing-home regulation (actually coercing the states to perform certain
licensing and certification functions), see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (9), (33) (1976),
that states might well be tempted to do only what the federal government requires
and no more. Second, the Medicaid program may indirectly encourage unscrupulous
continuing-care providers to try to extract higher entrance fees because they can rely
on the government to help pay monthly fees that residents can no longer afford.
Communities that rely primarily on entrance fees are inherently unstable; their
financial position is even more precarious when increases in monthly fees are limited
by Medicaid reimbursement schedules.
106 HALTH REsoxric STAnsncs, suiira note 4, at 328, 473, 479-80.
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nation and refunds. Through a narrow focus on the case-by-case
equities involved, and often with reference to vague notions of
public policy, state courts have only added to the financial un-
certainties of continuing care. Although the results of litigation
have been, in general, predictable, the inherent unpredictability of
cases in equity and the dearth of clear statements of law in the
courts' opinions have had two effects: potential plaintiffs are en-
couraged to litigate the particular facts of their grievances, and
communities are prevented from planning intelligently-instead,
they must devote a wasteful amount of resources to countering the
threat of costly litigation.
107
This latter problem is not merely one of inconvenience. Con-
tinuing-care providers resemble public utilities in the manner in
which increased costs are passed on directly to consumers of the
service. Increases in litigation costs therefore only increase the cost
of continuing care. Similarly, residents' fees must increase to pro-
tect the communities against the possibility of court-ordered refunds.
Contract-termination and refund suits may be divided for
analytical purposes into suits by residents, which generally are suc-
cessful, and suits by heirs of residents, which generally are not. A
brief review of each category will serve to introduce the case law
and illustrate the inadequacy of the judicial response to the prob-
lems of continuing care.
a. Suits by Residents
Many continuing-care agreements allow either party to termi-
nate the contract immediately and without cause within a certain
probationary period,10 8 allow the resident to terminate the contract
upon specified notice at any time,10 9 and allow the community to
107 At least one new continuing-care community, fearful of expensive and
time-consuming litigation, has drafted a contract that provides for refund of one-
half the entrance fee if the resident dies within one year of taking occupancy.
Interview with Hartman, supra note 51. And at least one existing community is
considering altering its contracts to provide the same refunds on death that occur
on withdrawal from the community. Interview with Allen R. Hunt, Esq., Chairman
of the Board of Directors, Kendal-Crosslands, Philadelphia, Pa. (Dec. 4, 1979)
(notes on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). Both of these
refund schemes simply increase residents' entrance and monthly fees and effectively
transfer wealth from the resident population to heirs.
108 "There shall be a probationary period of three months of residence . . .
which shall be considered a period of adjustment. During this period, either
Community or Resident may terminate this agreement .... ." Crosslands Corp.,
Residence and Care Agreement, 7 6(a), appended to Complaint, Mears v. Crosslands
Corp., No. 175 (Pa. C.P., Chester County, Oct. 3, 1979). See Jenkins, supra
note 15, at 21.
19 Resident has the right at any time prior to death, so long as Resident
is then in good general health and not suffering from any illness, to ter-
minate this agreement by delivering to Community written notice of his
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terminate the contract upon specified notice for good cause.110 Most
modern-form continuing-care agreements explicitly provide that
upon termination of the contract during the probationary period,
the resident is entitled to a full refund of all monies and property
transferred to the community less the reasonable cost of his care.-"
Even in the absence of specific contractual terms to this effect, the
courts have tended to order full refunds." 2
In general, courts have simply treated the continuing-care
agreements as more or less typical contracts. For example, com-
munities have not been able to rewrite the terms of fixed-rate con-
intent to do so. The written notice need not cite a specific reason for
the termination .... [lf the termination is to be effective] less than one
hundred twenty (120) days after the date of the written notice, it must
be first approved by the executive director ....
Crosslands Corp., Residence and Care Agreement, 16(b)(i), appended to Coni-
plaint, Mears v. Crosslands Corp., No. 175 (Pa. C.P., Chester County, Oct. 3, 1979).
See Jenkins, supra note 15, at 21.
.10 Community reserves the right to terminate this agreement for any
cause which, in the judgment of Community, shall be good and suicient,
as evidenced by any one or more of the following: failure on the part of
Resident to abide by the rules adopted by Community; the making of
any material misrepresentation or omission in connection with application
papers; a breach by Resident of any other of the terms of this agree-
ment . . . ; or if Resident's continued presence has become seriously
disruptive to or a threat to the safety of the other residents, or a threat
to the safety of Resident himself. In such case the Community shall
serve upon Resident written notice of termination specified to be effective
on a date not less than thirty (30) days nor later than one hundred
twenty (120) days after the date of notice.
Crosslands Corp., Residence and Care Agreement, 16(b)(ii), appended to Com-
plaint, Mears v. Crosslands Corp., No. 175 (Pa. C.P., Chester County, Oct. 3,
1979). See Jenkins, supra note 15, at 21-22.
In practice, communities have found it "almost impossible to evict a resident
except for the most 'grievous' conduct." Garrett M. Heher, Esq., Presentation at
the Continuing Care Seminar, in Valley Forge, Pa. (June 12, 1979) (proceedings
on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). But of. Onderdonk v.
Presbyterian Homes, Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 529, 410 A.2d 252 (App. Div. 1979)
(contract not a lease; therefore no statutory damages for retaliatory eviction).
"'For termination, notice of which was given during the three month
period of adjustment, Resident is entitled to a full refund of the Entry
Fee, less any costs, actually incurred by Community, of redecorating
Residents apartment..., and less any cost to Community of maintaining
Resident in Community's skilled nursing facility or in a hospital or other
special care facility, and of providing any medical care, which cost shall
be based upon the prevailing charges made by the Community normally
for such services.
Crosslands Corp., Residence and Care Agreement, 11 6(e)(i), appended to Com-
plaint, Mears v. Crosslands Corp., No. 175 (Pa. C.P., Chester County, Oct. 3,
1979). See Jenkins, supra note 15, at 21.
.12 E.g., Baltimore Humane Impartial Soc'y v. Marley, 150 Md. 478, 144
A. 521 (1929). See Dodge v. New Hampshire Centennial Home for Aged, 95
N.H. 472, 67 A.2d 10 (1949). Cf. Van Valkenburg v. Retirement Homes of
Detroit Annual Conference of Methodist Church, 7 Mich. App. 77, 151 N.W.2d
197 (1967) (failure of resident to comply with termination procedure in contract
can lead to forfeiture of property conveyed to community).
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tracts to take account of inflation."13  But in cases involving
contracts that provide that monthly fees may be increased by the
community, resident challenges to even significant increases in fees
have been rebuffed by the courts."14 Most courts have also accepted
the common modern-form contract provision 15 disavowing any
property interest of the resident either in his unit or in the com-
munity's plant or equipment."86
Except perhaps in the rare cases of termination by the com-
munity, which must be for "good cause," contract enforcement of
this sort does not require the courts even to address any community
problems that may underlie suits by residents. Nor do the indi-
vidual remedies granted necessarily have any beneficial effect on
either the community or the remaining residents.
b. Suits by Heirs
In contrast to the relative solicitude shown by courts to resident
plaintiffs, heirs of residents have almost uniformly been rebuffed in
their attempts to secure refunds of entrance fees or other property
transferred for prepayment of services. Most often, plaintiff heirs
have raised, and the courts have rejected, three related arguments:
that when the resident died shortly after paying a substantial sum
of money to the community for his care, the contract as performed
113 Garrett M. Heher, Esq., Presentation at the Continuing Care Seminar, in
Valley Forge, Pa. (June 12, 1979) (proceedings on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review). No reported cases involving this issue have been
discovered.
14 E.g., Onderdonk v. Presbyterian Homes, Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 529, 410
A.2d 252 (App. Div. 1979). See text following note 59 supra. The Onderdonk
court relied on the fact that the contract in question fully defined the rights of
the parties and on the general proposition that life-care contracts do not per se
create a fiduciary relationship between community and resident. Id. at 535-39,
410 A.2d at 256-58. See Grow v. Indiana Retired Teachers Community, 149 Ind.
App. 109, 271 N.E.2d 140 (1971).
115 "The rights and privileges granted to Resident by this agreement do not
include any right, title or interest in any part of the personal property, land,
buildings, and improvements owned or administered by Community. Residents
rights are primarily for services, with a contractual right of occupancy." Crosslands
Corp., Residence and Care Agreement, 118(a), appended to Complaint, Mears v.
Crosslands Corp., No. 175 (Pa. C.P., Chester County, Oct. 3, 1979). See Jenkins,
supra note 15, at 20-21.
116 American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Presbyterian Homes, 148 N.J. Super.
465, 372 A.2d 1147 (App. Div. 1977). The court in Onderdonk denied plaintiff
damages for retaliatory eviction under New Jersey's Landlord Reprisal Law, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-10.10 to .13 (West Supp. 1979), solely on this basis.
Onderdonk v. Presbyterian Homes, Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 529, 542, 410 A.2d 252,
259 (App. Div. 1979). See Houle v. Adams State College, 190 Colo. 406, 547
P.2d 926 (1976); Engelhardt v. Serena, 318 Mo. 263, 300 S.W. 268 (1927)
(dormitory students are not tenants). But see Kunkle v. The Philadelphia Rifle
Club, 10 Phila. 52 (Pa. 1873) (contract which by its terms appeared to be a.
personal license expiring upon plaintiff's death construed to be a lease).
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ivas unconscionable 117 or voidable for lack or insufficiency of con-
sideration; -11 and that because the termination rights of the com-
munity created only a limited promise to provide care, the arrange-
ment lacked mutuality.119 The courts have also rejected heirs'
arguments based on lack of capacity to contract; 120 fraud or undue
influence; 121 and illegality as a gambling or wagering contract, 2 2 as
an assignment of a possibility,23 as a testamentary disposition, 2 4 as
an unregulated life-insurance contract, 2 5 or as a contract of
adhesion.
2 6
The timing of residents' deaths has often provided the heirs'
only hope of success in refund suits, but the case law is not uniform.
For instance, in cases of residents dying during the probationary
period, heirs have been granted refunds. 2 7 But in cases involving
117 E.g., Sisters of Third Order of St. Francis v. Guillaume, 222 Ill. App. 543
(1921); Wilson v. Dexter, 135 Ind. App. 247, 192 N.E.2d 469 (1963); Dodge v.
New Hampshire Centennial Home for Aged, 95 N.H. 472, 67 A.2d 10 (1949);
Bower v. Estaugh, 146 NJ. Super. 116, 369 A.2d 20 (App. Div. 1977); Henry
Keep Home v. Moore, 198 Okla. 198, 176 P.2d 1016 (1947).
118 Wilson v. Dexter, 135 Ind. App. 247, 192 N.E.2d 469 (1963); Dalton v.
Florence Home for the Aged, 154 Neb. 735, 49 N.W.2d 595 (1951). In Gold v.
Salem Lutheran Home Ass'n, 53 Cal. 2d 289, 347 P.2d 687, 1 Cal. Reptr. 343
(1959), and Wilson v. Dexter, 135 Ind. App. 247, 192 N.E.2d 469 (1963), the
residents had never even occupied their housing units.
119 E.g., Inderkum v. German Old People's Home, 23 Cal. App. 2d 733, 74
P.2d 83 (1937); Maccabees v. Stone, 306 IM. App. 468, 28 N.E.2d 738 (1940);
Stoddard v. Gabriel, 234 Iowa 1366, 14 N.W.2d 737 (1944); Newburyport Soc'y
ifor Relief of Aged Women v. Noyes, 287 Mass. 530, 192 N.E. 54 (1934). But see
In re Mau's Estate, 186 Pa. 477, 40 A. 1010 (1898).
120 E.g., In re Heim's Estate, 166 Misc. 931, 3 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sur. Ct., Kings
County), aff'd, 255 A.D. 1007, 8 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1938). But see Estate of Ballard
v. Clay County, 355 S.W.2d 894 (Mo. 1962).
1
2 1 E.g., Borgeson v. Fairhaven Christian Home, 1 ]11. App. 3d 323, 272
N.E.2d 436 (1971); General German Aged People's Home v. Hammerbacker, 64
Md. 595, 3 A. 678 (1886); Old Men's Home v. Lee's Estate, 191 Miss. 679, 4
So. 2d 235 (1941).
122E.g., Bower v. Estaugh, 146 NJ. Super. 116, 369 A.2d 20 (App. Div.
1977); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Reeves, 96 N.J. Eq. 490, 125 A. 582 (1924),
.aff'd, 98 N.J. Eq. 412, 129 A. 922 (1925); Stiegelmeier v. West Side Deutscher
Frauen Verein, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 368, 178 N.E.2d 516 (1961); Mears v. Crosslands
Corp., No. 175 (Pa. C.P., Chester County, Oct. 3, 1979).
123 E.g., Hornstrom v. Beverly State Savings Bank, 304 IIl. App. 574, 26
N.E.2d 687 (1940); Newburyport Soc'y for Relief of Aged Women v. Noyes, 287
-Mass. 530, 192 N.E. 54 (1934).
124 E.g., Symmonds v. Pacific Homes, 224 Cal. App. 2d 507, 36 Cal. Rptr. 725
(1964). See Bower v. Estaugh, 146 NJ. Super. 116, 369 A.2d 20 (App. Div.
1977).
125 See, e.g., Mears v. Crosslands Corp., No. 175 (Pa. C.P., Chester County,
-Oct. 3, 1979).
126 See, e.g., id.
127 E.g., Christenson v. Board of Charities, 253 IMI. App. 380 (1929);
Evangelical Lutheran St. Stephan's Congregation v. Bishop, 213 IMI. App. 137
(1919); First Nat'l Bank v. Methodist Home for the Aged, 181 Kan. 100, 309 P.2d
-389 (1957); Farrand v. Redington Memorial Home, 270 A.2d 871 (Me. 1970);
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residents who died after the probationary period, and after having
given notice of termination, but before actually leaving the com-
munity, heirs have been denied refunds.128  When residents have
died outside the community after removal to hospitals for extended
care, the courts have split, but the better view has been that the
community was entitled to the entrance fee.129 Finally, commu-
nities have been allowed to keep the fees of residents who died
while on voluntary leave.130
The most revealing aspect of cases involving residents' heirs
has been the courts' generally poor articulation of the grounds for
decision. More often than not, the courts resort to ill-defined
notions of public policy.' 3 ' In fact, some of the cases most fre-
quently cited by judges are those in which the courts made explicit
a public policy in favor of institutions that care for the elderly-in
particular, continuing-care communities. 3 2
This Comment certainly does not take issue with such a policy;
rather, it disagrees with reliance on the judiciary to implement the
policy. The courts are simply incapable of creating a coherent
legal framework for continuing care by deciding individual cases.
First, the major problems of continuing-care operations discussed
Brydges v. Home for the Aged, 373 Mich. 408, 129 N.W.2d 869 (1969); Lyon v.
Willamette Lutheran Homes, Inc., 240 Or. 56, 399 P.2d 895 (1965).
Plaintiff heirs have not been successful, however, in the face of clear contractual
provisions precluding refunds in such situations. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Basler, 225
Cal. App. 2d 327, 37 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1964); Dodge v. New Hampshire Centennial
Home for Aged, 95 N.H. 472, 67 A.2d 10 (1949). Compare Bower v. Estaugh,
146 N.J. Super. 116, 369 A.2d 20 (App. Div. 1977), with Biemenschneider v.
Altenheim, 146 N.J. Super. 123, 369 A.2d 24 (App. Div. 1977).
.28 E.g., Nicolaysen v. Pacific Home, 65 Cal. App. 2d 769, 151 P.2d 567
(1944).
129Compare Connelly v. Methodist Home, 190 A.2d 550 (D.C. App. 1963);
Dalton v. Florence Home for the Aged, 154 Neb. 735, 49 N.W.2d 595 (1951);
Stiegelmeier v. West Side Deutscher Frauen Veretn, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 368, 178
N.E.2d 516 (1961), with Chappell v. Odd Fellows' Home, Inc., 85 R.L 429, 132
A.2d 72 (1957); Stocking v. Hall, 81 R.I. 168, 100 A.2d 408 (1953).
130 E.g., In re Heian's Estate, 166 Misc. 931, 3 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sur. Ct., Kings
County), aff'd, 255 A.D. 1007, 8 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1938).
131 Although the courts have not made clear the basis of this policy, justifiable
grounds do exist for a general policy of favoring residents and ruling against heirs.
When heirs sue for refunds, they do not usually question the quality of the
community's performance; rather, they argue that the quantity was not sufficient
to warrant retention of the full entrance fee. Dissatisfaction with the quality of
performance is more likely to underlie suits by residents. Moreover, residents'
suits often are intended to disgorge from the communities sums essential to the
future maintenance of the plaintiffs, whereas suits by heirs may be viewed as
attempts to augment estates knowingly and intentionally diminished by the de-
cedents when they entered the communities.
132E.g., Wilson v. Dexter, 135 Ind. App. 247, 192 N.E.2d 469 (1963); Dodge
v. New Hampshire Centennial Home for Aged, 95 N.H. 472, 67 A.2d 10 (1949);
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v., Reeves, 96 N.J. Eq. 490, 125 A. 582 (1924), aff'd,
98 N.J. Eq. 412, 129 A. 922 (1925).
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in this Comment are neither presented to the courts nor susceptible
to judicial solution. Second, by substituting ad hoc and narrow
policy analysis for legal analysis, the courts only end up injecting
yet another element of uncertainty into an already precarious finan-
cial structure. Summing up the problem quite nicely, one New
Jersey court has said: "[T]he necessary balance between the needs
and responsibilities of elderly residents and the management of a
retirement community can best be achieved by a comprehensive
legislative program, and not by ad hoc court remedies which ef-
fectually restructure the parties' agreement." 133 The following
sections discuss the options for that legislative program that lie
between inaction and outright prohibition.
B. Intermediate Regulation
Two intermediate possibilities must be analyzed before exten-
sive regulation is discussed. The first is selective, specific regulation
of the most egregious problems of continuing care, an attempt to
eliminate the worst dangers without imposing a full-scale regulatory
apparatus on the industry. The second, based on recognition of the
fact that the distinctive problems of continuing care are financial,
separates the financing from the provision of services by shifting
the responsibility for money management to a third-party payor in
the already heavily regulated insurance industry. Although each of
these responses has some merit, neither is adequate to achieve the
full protection of continuing-care residents.
1. Selective Regulation
As used here, selective regulation is an attempt by a legislature
to isolate one or two problematic aspects of continuing care and to
regulate those features only. Experience with this form of regula-
tion has not been entirely satisfactory.
Illinois,134 Connecticut,m and Oregon 136 each have chosen to
regulate a single aspect of the continuing-care institution. Con-
necticut and Illinois statutorily limit the eligibility of life-care resi-
dents to receive public assistance or Medicaid. They thereby
O133Onderdonk v. Presbyterian Homes, Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 529, 539, 410
A.2d 252, 258 (App. Div. 1979). See Bozzo v. Jacobs, 59 Cal. App. 3d 158, 130
Cal. Rptr. 524 (1976).
134 ILL. AN. STAT. ch. 23, § 3-1.5 (Smith-Hurd 1971); IMI. Dep't of Public
Aid Rules & Regulations, art. 8, rule 8.02.02, cited in Cornue v. Department of
Pub. Aid, 64 nM. 2d 78, 81, 354 NE.2d 359, 361 (1976).
135 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-116, 17-316 (West 1958).
336 OR. REV. STAT. § 91.690 (1977).
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effectively counter whatever incentive federal Medicaid regulations
create to use large entrance-fee contracts."1 Oregon's statute ob-
viates the need for some refund litigation by requiring that any
cash fees or transfers of property made prior to or during the first
six months of occupancy must be refunded to any resident who
withdraws from the facility within six months of occupancy.
188
None of these state responses is clearly wrong, but all are in-
adequate even to solve the limited problems they address. The
Connecticut and Illinois statutes eliminate the incentive for oper-
ators to use high entrance fees, but potentially penalize an other-
wise eligible Medicaid recipient who has entered into a life-care
contract. And the Oregon law deals with only part of the problem
of suits for refunds: because death is not considered "withdrawal,"
heirs of a resident who died within six months of occupancy may
still litigate their claim to a refund. 89 Finally, and most impor-
tant, although each of these states has focused on a cause of financial
instability in continuing-care institutions, each has chosen one cause
137 See note 105 supra. In Connecticut, see CoNm. Gsrt. STAT. ANN. § 17-116
(West 1975), a life-care resident (life care is not defined) is eligible for assistance
only if: (1) care under the contract commenced before April 3, 1957; (2) the
operator is a charitable institution; (3) the applicant is a resident at the time
of application; (4) the consideration paid for the resident's care has been exhausted,
assuming a rate of $75 per month; and (5) the income of the provider is insufficient
to permit continued performance of the agreement. But see Rowland v. Maher, 176
Conn. 57, 404 A.2d 894 (1978) (related statute, CoNr. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-109(e) (West 1958), held unconstitutional as contrary to federal policy that
only legitimate ground for withholding Medicaid is actual availability of assets).
See also Buckner v. Maher, 424 F. Supp. 366 (D. Conn. 1976) (three-judge court),
aff'd, 434 U.S. 898 (1977). The Rowland court also stated that § 17-116 was
unconstitutional to the extent that it "deprives a person holding a life contract of
medical assistance on any ground other than actual availability of assets." 176
Conn. at 63, 404 A.2d at 898.
Under ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 3-1.5 (Smith-Hurd 1971), a person main-
tained in a private institution qualifies for aid only if he has not purchased care,
or, if he has, only if his payment has been wholly consumed. The rules of the
Illinois Department of Public Aid explain that "[a] resident who has an agreement
for life-care . . . shall be considered not in need of public assistance on the basis
that he has a resource to meet his needs." Ill. Dep't of Public Aid Rules and
Regulations, art. 8, rule 8.02.02, cited in Cornue v. Department of Pub. Aid, 64
Ill. 2d 78, 81, 354 N.E.2d 359, 361 (1976). The difference between the statute
and the rule is quite significant: the statute seems to say that any life-care resident
who lived longer than expected would be eligible for aid because his entrance fee
would have been "wholly consumed"; the regulation explicitly negatives this
interpretation.
The Illinois Supreme Court has upheld both the statute and regulation.
Cornue v. Department of Pub. Aid, 64 Ill. 2d 78, 354 N.E.2d 359 (1976),
reversing Cornue v. Weaver, 29 Ill. App. 3d 546, 331 N.E.2d 148 (1975). See
Reynolds v. Department of Pub. Aid, 26 IM. App. 3d 933, 326 N.E.2d 109 (1975).
These decisions, however, were based on construction of the statute and regulation
and did not involve consideration of federal constitutional limits.
138 OR. REv. STAT. § 91.690 (1977); see notes 108-33 supra & accompanying
text.
139 See notes 127-30 supra & accompanying text.
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to the exclusion of all others. That is the most that can be accom-
plished by selective regulation, and it is not enough: were a com-
munity to go bankrupt, it would be small solace indeed that the
cause of its failure was not one of those regulated by the state.
2. Third-Party Money Management
The second intermediate response is to separate provision of
services from financing of services. Under such an approach, the
prospective resident would purchase a continuing-care contract from
a third party, most likely an insurance company, and the community
would enter into a service contract with the resident and a payment
contract with the financing agent. The resident would pay an
initial lump sum, as in the standard modern-form arrangement, and
promise to pay monthly fees to the insurance company. The in-
surance company would agree to pay the provider for the cost of
the resident's care in either the residential or nursing facilities.
Although the resident's move to the nursing facility would increase
the amount the insurance company would pay to the community,
the resident's monthly premium would not change. The advantages
of independence and insurance found in modern-form continuing-
care arrangements would thus be fully preserved.
The argument in favor of this response is as follows: Finan-
cially, continuing care resembles a reverse form of life insurance
similar to an annuity plan. Rather than create an entirely new
regulatory mechanism, we should recognize this characteristic of
continuing care for what it is and place responsibility for the insti-
tution's money management in a third party (the insurance com-
pany) whose financial practices are already comprehensively regu-
lated. 40 Such a step would have the incidental advantage of
spreading the risk of individual continuing-care communities and
minimizing the high risk of starting a new community.' 4 ' The key
advantage of this form of financing, however, seems to be its capacity
to minimize the disincentive to care that the continuing-care form
produces. This disincentive results from the community's need to
generate new entrance fees through turnover of residents when
mortality-rate projections-upon which fees are based-prove erro-
1 40 E.g., CAL. INsuANcE CODE §§ 1-15003 (West 1972); N.Y. IMSURnAE
LAw §§ 1-701 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1979-1980). See R. KEET N, BAsic TEXT
ON INSURANCE LAw 537-83 (1971).
-141 The greatest financial risk to a community's survival arises during its first
years in operation. See notes 55-56 supra & accompanying text. Financing by
insurance companies, which presumably would cover many residents in different
communities at different stages of development, would reduce this risk.
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neous.142 Use of a third-party payor, the argument runs, would
remove the incentive to cut costs from the community administrators
who control the quality of care. Thus, third-party financing seems
to preserve the advantages of continuing care while eliminating
some of the disadvantages.
But such a system entails serious administrative problems. For
example, given the tremendous disparity in both entrance and
monthly fees between communities, 14 an insurer would have to
devise and administer different rate schedules for each community
with which it did business. Also, fee increases would be more
difficult to implement because the party that must ultimately collect
the increase, the insurer, is one step removed from the decision to
increase rates.'"
To be sure, neither of these objections alone is sufficiently
substantial to merit rejection of the proposal. But the solution to
these problems-collaboration between insurers and providers to
match premiums and costs-undercuts the argument that third-party
financing will minimize the disincentive to care. It also creates the
142 Because the community bases its fees on actuarial projections, its financial
stability may be threatened if residents-in the aggregate--do not die at predicted
rates. See notes 55 & 76 supra & accompanying text. For example, assume a
total-fee-in-advance community in which the fee is set at $10,000 per year of life
expectancy. If everyone lives, on the average, six months beyond that life ex-
pectancy, the community will go bankrupt. Faced with the threat of bankruptcy,
the community has an incentive to "kill off" its residents-and a corresponding
disincentive to care for them: the sooner everyone dies, the more money the
community has at its disposal from the entrance fees paid by the deceased
residents, and the sooner the community can solicit new residents and new entrance
fees.
No one expects continuing-care communities to murder their residents, but the
special needs of elderly people can lead to the same result if affirmative steps are
not taken to enrich their lives. For instance, if the residents are not happy, they
will not have as strong a desire to live. See 1975 SENATE REPoRT, supra note 4,
at X-XII; C. TowNsEND, supra note 14, at 104-10. The disincentive to care is
most often confronted and most likely to be harmful in deciding whether to spend
additional dollars on better-qualified staff, meals, and interior decoration and
atmosphere. Such expenditures increase not only costs in the current fiscal year,
but also long-run costs to the extent the average lifetime of residents is lengthened
as a result of the improvements. See generally 1975 SENATE REPoT, supra note 4,
at XVII-XX; C. TowNSEND, supra note 14, at 122-32.
The disincentive to care is far more acute in communities that use assignment-
of-all-assets or total-fee-in-advance contracts, or otherwise rely excessively on
entrance fees. To the extent the community draws on monthly payments to finance
care, the disincentive is minimized because of the community's ability to raise fees
when actuarial projections prove wrong. But when all fees are either prepaid or
fixed, turnover of residents-one way or another-is the only solution to revenue
problems.
1
4 3 See note 14 supra.
144 Note also that this financing arrangement would increase the cost of
continuing-care service: the financial middleman would certainly-and not un-
reasonably-expect to be paid for its services.
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problem of essentially cost-based reimbursement for continuing care.
When continuing-care communities decide they need more revenue,
they need not approach the resident population directly. Similarly,
when residents object to the rate increases, their complaints will go
to the insurance company, which is one step removed from the
decision to spend. Such a system, in short, would reduce the in-
centives that now exist for legitimate cost cutting and would result
in higher prices for the consumer. 45
Finally, the purported minimization of the disincentive to care
is simply not an advantage of third-party money management over
modem-form community financing. In a modern-form community,
an individual's basic monthly payment covers more than the cost of
his housing, but less than the cost of his care in the nursing facility.
Because his fee does not change when he is transferred to the
nursing facility, the community has an interest in keeping the resi-
dent healthy and out of the nursing facility. Only in communities
that do not use modern-form financing and do not rely primarily
on monthly fees to cover operating costs does a resident's unexpected
longevity cost the community money.146 The sensible regulatory
response, therefore, is not the indirect third-party-payor approach-
which has its own problems-but the direct regulation of certain
financial practices of continuing-care providers. The effect of such
regulation on quality of care would be enhanced by two nonfinancial
factors: the professional ethics of community doctors and nurses '47
145 Although the analogy is incomplete, useful reference may be had to the
effect on hospital costs of domination of financing by third-party payors. The
third-party payors of hospital costs are private insurers and the government.
When hospitals seek to increase their charges, they simply inform the third-party
payors. Any cost increases are passed on to the consumer in the form of higher
premiums or taxes.
Costs inevitably increase in such a system as a result of the breakdown of
incentives to behave in an economically efficient manner. Hospitals have less
incentive to economize to the extent they pass on costs to the third-party payors.
STAFF OF SENATE CoaNr. ON FnINrAcE, 96TH CONG., IsT SEss., BACKGROUND
MATERzALs RELATNGO TO S. 505 AN Omm EHEaL CARm CosT CoNA mrszErr Po-
PosArs 1 (Comm. Print 1979). Similarly, continuing-care communities would lose
much of their current incentive to economize if third parties paid their costs. Moreover,
the third-party-insurance payors, whether governmental or private, lack the means
and incentives to monitor provider costs and efficiency meaningfully. Hearings on
Inflation of Health Care Costs, 1976, Before the Subcomm. on Health of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33, 110-11,
795 (1976) (statements of Dr. Theodore Cooper, Leonard Woodcock, & Morton D.
Miller). There is no reason to believe this observation would not apply as well to
continuing care.
146 See note 14 supra & text following note 58 supra.
147 Every doctor takes the "Hippocratic Oath," as follows in part: "I will use
treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judgment, but never with a
view to injury and wrong-doing. . . . I will abstain from all intentional wrong-
doing and harm, especially from abusing the bodies of man or woman. ...-
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and the existence of residents' committees to help set and monitor
community policies.148
C. Extensive Regulation
This Comment's preference for some form of regulation of
continuing care has been expressed from the outset. The analysis
and critique of regulatory programs ranging from inaction to pro-
hibition of continuing care bring us to the threshold of the proper
response to the problems sketched in part II-extensive regulation.
Arizona, 149 California,80 Colorado, 51 Florida, 5 2 and Michi-
gan l5 have responded to the potential and actual problems of con-
tinuing care with statutory schemes that may fairly be characterized
as extensive regulation. This Comment now breaks down these five
states' legislation into eleven constituent parts and describes each
state's approach to each type of provision.
The analysis of each regulatory component is followed by an
evaluative discussion that concludes with a judgment whether such
a provision should be adopted and, if so, when. The philosophy
upon which these judgments are based is as follows: A first stage of
regulation should be designed to improve the functioning of the
market in continuing-care services through consumer education.
Because of the high stakes and some inherent market imperfections,
some minimum financial safeguards should also be provided at this
stage. Slightly more intrusive, and therefore more expensive, pro-
posed regulatory devices should be reserved for a second stage of
regulation, to be implemented only if necessary. A proposed third
stage-a last resort-would involve the state governments in direct
fee regulation such as is currently imposed only in the most heavily
regulated industries.
Hippocratic Oath, cited in ETMICS IN MEDICINE 5 (S. Reiser, A. Dyck, & W. Curran
eds. 1977). See Bok, The Tools of Bioethics, in id. 137, 138.
Nurses are also subject to a strict code of ethics:
Inasmuch as the nurse's primary commitment is to the patient's care and
safety, she must be alert to, and take appropriate action regarding, any
instances of incompetent, unethical, or illegal practice by any member
of the health care team, or any action on the part of others that is
prejudicial to the patient's best interests.
American Nurses' Association, Code for Nurses, reprinted in I. MuRcmsoNi & T.
NicaoLS, LEGAL Fou-ATnIONS OF Nunsc PRAcTICE 468, 470 (1970).
148 See notes 237-40 infra & accompanying text.
149Apuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§20-1801 to -1811 (Supp. 1979).
150 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1770-1790.6 (West 1979 & Supp. 1980).
151 COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 12-13-101 to -117 (1978).
15 2 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 651.011-.132 (West Supp. 1978). See FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 651.01-.12 (West 1972).
15s McH. COMP. LAws ANN, . §§ 554.801-.844 (Supp. 1979).
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Thus, this Comment strives to develop the most unintrusive
regulatory scheme possible, given the significant public interests at
stake. As will be seen, some components of the current state pro-
grams are not necessary at any level of regulation; most others are
not necessary in the first stage. Some possibly necessary devices,
explored in a separate section, have not yet been adopted by
any state.
In general, it may be said that no one state, and not even all
five states taken together, have successfully come to grips with the
problems of continuing care. Some have not even been able to
devise an adequate definition of the institutions they wish to regu-
late. All the state systems fail to tread the delicate line between
requirements sufficiently comprehensive to prevent or at least warn
of financial disaster and regulations sufficiently manageable to mini-
mize the costs of compliance. The net result has been a general
lack of enforcement. 54
These problems aside, the current state efforts fall critically
short in several particulars. None of these five states prohibits as-
signment-of-all-assets or total-fee-in-advance contracts. None at-
tempts to regulate the setting of fees-or to prohibit excessive
reliance on entrance fees-to ensure at least minimum financial
security for residents. And no state takes account of the full range
of case law in its regulation of the contents of continuing-care
agreements, thus leaving resolution of many questions to costly and
inefficient litigation.
The prospect for continuing care is not attractive. The United
States is faced with the existence and probable growth of institutions
that offer a novel and desirable means of providing housing and
medical care for the elderly. Because of the dynamics of continuing
care and the lack of sufficient governmental protection, many of
these institutions may fail, creating enormous pressures on govern-
ment to prohibit continuing-care operations 155 or to overregulate
them to the point of extinction. 156 The policymaker's task, there-
154 The Pacific Homes failure, see notes 85-96 supra & accompanying text,
provides a perfect example. From at least 1954, Pacific Homes's reserve funds
were maintained below California's statutory minimum level. From at least 1965,
the annual reports of Pacific Homes to the state disclosed this violation of the
statute. It was not until seven years later that the state recorded a lien on behalf
of all residents. Pacific Homes's authority to enter into life-care contracts was
never revoked. And the state later subordinated the residents' lien to further
borrowings. PAcinc HoMEs BANKRUPTCy REPORT, supra note 83, at 52-53.
155New York and Pennsylvania seem to have attempted this. See notes
165-71 infra & accompanying text.
156This seems to have happened in Arizona. See notes 158-59 infra &
accompanying text.
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fore, is to fashion a workable, minimally intrusive regulatory pro-
gram to protect the continuing-care industry from its own intrinsic
failings. This Comment now considers the elements of such a
program.
1. Definition of Continuing Care
As several states have found, defining the types of institutions to
which their regulations will apply is not easy. California's defini-
tion seems to have avoided the most dangerous pitfalls by defining
"life care contract" to include terminable continuing-care agree-
ments. 157 Arizona uses a similar definition, 158 but most facilities
within that state have stopped charging entrance fees altogether,
thereby escaping regulation, and have instead raised their monthly
fees, thus moving one step closer to becoming fee-for-service pro-
viders.159 The first Florida legislation applied only to institutions
using the total-fee-in-advance or assignment-of-all-assets methods of
financing 1 0 and only to contracts for life or for a term of years. 16'
Because the statute did not apply to communities that charged both
an entrance fee and monthly fees or to those that offered continuing
care with mutual rights of termination, the regulations soon became
obsolete. 62 Florida has solved these problems by expanding the
scope of its new statute beyond fixed-fee arrangements 163 and by
explicitly including continuing care in the definition of "care for a
term of years." 164
Two further illustrations of definitional problems come from
states that may have attempted to prohibit life-care arrangements.
157 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1771(i) (West Supp. 1980). Michigan's
definition apparently also has caused few problems. MicH. CoMP. LAws A-,N.
§§ 554.803(5)-(6) (Supp. 1979).
158Aarz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-1801(5) (Supp. 1979).
159 Ohio Nursing Home Commission Memorandum from Paul Wallace to
Catherine Hawes (Oct. 18, 1978) (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review). Although the statute has been in effect since January 1, 1978, only
two facilities in the state are currently regulated under it. Id. Evasion of this
sort is a risk in any regulatory scheme, and there is not much to be done about
it. Regulations should not force providers out of the continuing-care market, but
they must be drafted tightly enough to have some effect.
1
60 FL.. STAT. ANm. §651.02(4) (West 1972).
161 Id. § 651.02(3). Colorado's statute is similar. CoLO. REv. STAT.
§ 12-13-101(7) (1978) (care "for the life of an aged person").
162 See Comment, Florida's Life Care Law: Revitalizing a Dormant Statute to
Protect the Elderly, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 1016, 1019-20 (1976). This omission
was far worse than the Arizona loophole because the principal danger of continuing
care-large advance payments which can be fraudulently or negligently dissipated
by the provider-exists even when entrance-fee-plus-monthly-fee terminable con-
tracts are used.
163 FIA. STAT. ANN. §§ 651.011(6), (8) (West Supp. 1978).
1641d. § 651.011(7); see id. § 651.011(2).
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New York's nursing home regulations prohibit any "residential
health care facility" operator from accepting prepayment for "basic
services" for more than three months 16 or from entering into any
contract or agreement for "life care." 166 This language has been
understood to mean that continuing-care communities are pro-
hibited in New York; 167 yet it arguably does not apply to com-
munities that offer mutually terminable contracts'168 and earmark
prepaid entrance fees for capital expenditures rather than "basic
services." 169 Similarly, Pennsylvania's nursing home regulations
provide that "Skilled Nursing and Intermediate Care Facilities shall
not require or permit a patient to assign his assets to the facility in
return for a life care guarantee," 170 yet continuing-care communities
that use mutually terminable contracts are flourishing in that
state.171
An essential element of a first-level regulatory program is a
precise definition of the subject of regulation. The definitions of
life care found in Florida, Arizona, and California can serve as
models of statutory language. Further, in order to protect the
financial feasibility of continuing care, assignment-of-all-assets and
total-fee-in-advance contracts must be strictly prohibited.
2. Certification Provisions
All five states require that the provider be certified prior to
the execution of any continuing-care agreements. Colorado and
Florida both require provisional certificates of authority. 7 2 The
165 N.Y. Code of Rules and Regulations fit. 10, § 730.2(f) (1979); see id.
§§ 415.1(f), 420.1(f).
166 I& § 730.3(b); see id. § 414.16(b).
167 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 40, at 350.
168 See notes 12-13 supra.
169 See text following notes 56 & 61 supra. In fact, at least 13 facilities in
New York purport to offer continuing-care contracts. AMEICA AssocATIoN OF
HOMEs FoR TnE AGING, DIRECTORY or MEMNBEs 44-52 (1979). Ironically, the only
form of continuing care that seems to be allowed in New York is particularly stable
financially. See notes 59-60 supra & accompanying text. Given the wording of the
regulations, it is not likely that this result was intended.
17028 PA. CODE § 201.38 (1979). The confusion surrounding this regulation
arises from the failure to define 'life care" and the use of the word "assets" without
more: does it mean any assets, thus apparently prohibiting continuing care, or all
assets, thus apparently prohibiting only assignment-of-all-assets contracts? See
Jenkins, supra note 54, at 27.
17 1 See N. AnELm'NN, supra note 14, at 69-77; AmERCAw AssocATxo q oF
HomEs FOR Tm AGING, DIBEcTORY or Mmnmas 61-68 (1979).
172 Colorado's provision is quite general, and the purposes of the provisional
certificate are unclear. COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-13-104(1) (1978). Florida's require-
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Arizona, California, and Michigan statutes simply provide that a
continuing-care operator may not sell or offer to sell a continuing-
care contract until a certificate of authority is granted. 73  Applica-
tions for certification, accompanied by the required attachments, 174
are made to the appropriate state departments. 75 The most impor-
tant attachments are actual and projected financial statements, 17 a
copy of the contract to be used,"7 and ownership and financial-
responsibility disclosure statements. 7 8 Michigan also prohibits pro-
prietary operators from entering into "pure" life-care agreements. 7 9
The Colorado, Florida, and Michigan statutes provide for annual
renewal of the certificate of authority after required financial forms
ment applies only to new operators who have not yet acquired the necessary facilities
or land or begun construction of the continuing-care facility. Such operators must
submit advertising, organizational information, and a statement of proposed location
and size to the state. The state then issues a provisional certificate that entitles the
provider to collect deposits from prospective residents, as long as they are kept in
escrow, and to undertake the feasibility study required for permanent certification.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 651.031 (West Supp. 1978).
'73 Auz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-1802, -1803 (Supp. 1979); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1770(a) (West Supp. 1980); MicH. CouP. LAws ANN. § 554.807
(Supp. 1979).
174 The list of required attachments varies significantly among states. See, e.g.,
A=Ix. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-1802(B) (Supp. 1979); CAL. HEATH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 1771.3-.8 (West 1979 & Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 651.026 (West Supp.
1978); MIcH. Comr,. LAws ANN. § 554.808 (Supp. 1979).
175 The statutes in Arizona and Florida are administered by the state depart-
ments of insurance. California's is administered by the State Department of Social
Services. Michigan vests control in the Corporation and Securities Bureau of the
Department of Commerce. Colorado established a Board of Examiners of Life Care
Institutions in the Division of Registrations of the Department of Regulatory
Agencies.
176 Examples of the statements required are balance sheets, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1771.4 (West 1979); FLA. STAT. AmN. § 651.026(4)(g)(1) (West
Supp. 1978); MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. §554.808(f)(i) (Supp. 1979); income
statements, Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-1802(B)(16) (Supp. 1979); CAL. HEALTH
& SAETY CODE § 1771.4-.5 (West 1979 & Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 651.026
(4) (g) (3) (West Supp. 1978); and statements of use of proceeds, Amuz. RFEv. STAT.
ANN. §20-1802(B)(14) (Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. §651.026(4)(g)(4)
(West Supp. 1978); Micr. CoiMP. LAws ANN. §554.808(f)(iii) (Supp. 1979).
Colorado apparently has no such requirements. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 12-13-104
(1978).
377 The provisions that must be included in the contract vary from state to
state. See notes 244-62 infra & accompanying text.
178 The Arizona and California statutes are the most advanced in this area.
Axtrz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-1802(B) (Supp. 1979); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1771.8(d)-(e), (h)-(k) (West 1979). They require the applicant to disclose the
true corporate and individual owners of the facility; any entity, including a parent
or other affiliate, holding more than a 10% interest in the applicant; any affiliation
of the applicant with a nonprofit, religious, or charitable institution and the extent
of that institution's financial responsibility for the applicant; and any civil or criminal
action against the applicant, a principal, or a corporate affiliate.
179 MICH. Comp,. LAws ANN. § 554.805(5) (Supp. 1979).
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are filed and specific statutory requirements met. 8 0 Arizona's and
California's certificates are valid until revoked, but annual reports
similar to the financial filings in the other states are still required.18
All the states except Arizona have procedures for revocation and/or
suspension of certificates of authority. 2
Certification requirements should be imposed only as part of
the second stage of regulation. The cost of such requirements to
the state and the community simply may not be justified by their
limited impact on the problems of continuing care. If a certifica-
tion scheme is adopted, however, it should require both provisional
and permanent certification; the former, particularly when used to
mandate feasibility studies, encourages well-planned projects. A
strong emphasis on true ownership disclosure to the administering
agency and the public would also be a good idea.
The administering agency should be a department of insurance
or similar bureau because the issues involved are primarily financial,
not medical. No analogue to Michigan's exclusion of proprietary
operators is either desirable or feasible.183 Finally, an annual re-
newal requirement is not necessary or desirable; it only increases
paperwork. The California and Michigan approach of using per-
180 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 12-13-104(3) (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 651.026(1),
(8) (West Supp. 1978); MicH. Com. LAws AwN. §§ 554.821-.822 (Supp. 1979).
' 8 1 Amz. Rev. STAT. ANN. §§20-1803(B), -1807 (Supp. 1979); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §§ 1782.5, 1783 (West 1979 & Supp. 1980).
18 2 The Florida Department of Insurance is empowered to refuse to renew the
certificate or to seek court assistance in enforcing the act. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 651.026(8), .105, .114, .125 (West Supp. 1978). The Department of Social
Services in California may suspend, limit, or revoke a certificate because of (1)
failure to maintain minimum reserves; (2) failure to file an annual report; (3)
failure to maintain the reserve fund escrow account at the proper level; (4) failure
to abide by a limitation imposed by the Department; or (5) violation of any rules
or regulations of the Department. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1784 (West
1979). Colorado allows revocation or suspension for violation of any section of the
statute or failure to meet reserve requirements. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-13-105
(1978). Michigan offers the most comprehensive regulation, providing that the
Corporation and Securities Bureau can seek suspension or revocation of a provider's
registration if it finds that such an action would be in the public interest and that
one of eight enumerated problems exist, including fraudulent or illegal practices,
unreasonable financial risk, or any violation of the act. MiCH. Comap. LAws A r.
§ 554.817 (Supp. 1979).
183 Such a provision, based on the notion that profit-seeking has an adverse
effect on the quality of care, attempts to eliminate the opportunity to profit from
continuing-care operations. A policy of excluding proprietary operators would not
effectively achieve this aim. First, the policy is too broad in that it would exclude
desirable proprietary operators from the industry. Second, it is too narrow in that
it could be easily circumvented. A person who wishes to operate a continuing-care
community for profit can establish a nonprofit "front" that will, in effect, distribute
"profits" to him through contracts with companies he owns or controls-specifically,
a management services company hired to run the community. This arrangement
breaks the "nondistribution constraint" traditionally associated with nonprofit organi-
zations. See generally Hansmann, supra note 49, at 838. Compare notes 68-71
supra & accompanying text.
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petual certificates subject to revocation or suspension and requiring
annual reporting and auditing is adequate.184
3. Escrow Provisions
Arizona, California, Florida, and Michigan all have statutory
escrow provisions to deal with the problems of fraudulent diversion
of entrance fees prior to occupancy 185 and the inability to pay off
long-term capital debt as it becomes due.1i 6 Arizona and Michigan
require that prepaid monies be placed in escrow at least until the
resident occupies the unit; 187 Florida's escrow requirement applies
only until the authorization certificate is issued.188 Michigan also
grants the Corporation and Securities Bureau the discretion to re-
quire an escrow deposit of a "reasonable" amount when the facility's
economic condition is precarious.8 9
A requirement like Arizona's that all entrance fees paid to the
community prior to occupancy be held in escrow is an essential
element of a first-level regulatory program. The existence of such
an escrow account minimizes the possibility of fraudulent or negli-
gent dissipation of uncommitted funds. In contrast, a mandatory
escrow account for entrance fees paid after occupancy serves no use-
ful purpose. Required maintenance of adequate reserves in safe
and relatively liquid investments is satisfactory.
4. Reserve Requirements
To protect the continuing-care community against unexpect-
edly low rates of turnover early in its existence 190 or miscalculations
184 Admittedly, current annual audit requirements have not met with spectacular
success. The Pacific Homes collapse could have been less severe had the California
state authorities properly performed their duties under the statute. See note 86
supra; note 91 supra & accompanying text. State implementation of federal Medi-
caid auditing requirements also has been remarkably lax. From 1966 to 1975, 20
states did not conduct a single audit of a Medicaid-eligible long-term facility. 1976
HousE REPonT, supra note 6, at 29-31.
185 See notes 62-63 & 75 supra & accompanying text.
186 See text following note 61 supra.
187 A=. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-1804 (Supp. 1979); MicH. CoiMw. LAws ANN.
§554.810(b) (Supp. 1979). Arizona's statute has a complex formula for deter-
mining when the entrance fees deposited in escrow may be released. If the fee is
for a unit that is currently occupied, it will be released when the unit becomes
available for occupancy by the payor. If the fee is for a new unit, it is released
when three requirements are satisfied: (1) construction is substantially complete
and an occupancy permit issued; (2) commitment has been secured for long-term
financing; and (3) aggregate entrance fees added to proceeds from long-term
financing total 90% of the total cost of the facility pins 90% of the money necessary
to fund start-up losses. Anuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-1804(A)(2) (Supp. 1979).
188 FLA. STAT. A-N. § 651.031(4) (West Supp. 1978). See note 172 supra.
189 Mica. Com. LAws ANN. § 554.816 (Supp. 1979).
190 See text following note 55 supra.
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in mortality rates,191 as well as to ensure a minimum level of finan-
cial stability, all five states except Michigan mandate the mainte-
nance of financial reserves.192 Two features of these reserve require-
ments will be analyzed here: the required size of the reserves and
investment limitations on reserve funds.
Arizona requires establishment of a reserve fund that equals
the total of the principal and interest payments due over the follow-
ing year "on account of any first mortgage or other long-term
financing of the facility." 19 California's basic requirement is simi-
lar, but increases the minimum level of the reserve fund by the
amount of any rental payments due during the year. 94 California
has an additional requirement, also in force in Florida, that reserves
be sufficient to cover the obligations assumed under continuing-care
agreements, as calculated through the use of state-approved mortality
tables. 95 Colorado's reserve calculation is slightly more compli-
cated but is designed to achieve the same result.'96 California,
Colorado, and Florida, which, unlike Arizona, do not require place-
ment of reserve funds in escrow, do regulate the type of investments
for which the funds may be used. Because the California and
Colorado reserves are set very high in order to approximate total
current obligations, the reserves may include not only traditional
investment "safeties" such as cash deposited in banks, approved
stocks and bonds, and specified investments in property and mutual
funds, but also high percentages of the net equity in buildings and
equipment used to service the resident population. 97 Florida al-
191 See notes 76-79 supra & accompanying text.
192 The theory behind the reserve requirements is that communities should have
a certain level of cash or near-cash reserves available to pay debts as they become
due. But even reserves, unless astronomical, cannot help a community with severe
financial problems over the long run. At best, continued inadequacy of reserves
can serve as a warning of impending financial collapse. See note 91 supra &
accompanying text.
193 Aiz. REv. STAT. ANm. § 20-1806 (Supp. 1979). Arizona requires that
these funds be kept in an escrow account, but permits partial release to the pro-
vider under certain circumstances. Id.
1
9 4 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1774.4 (West 1979).
19 5 CAL. HEALT & SAFETY CODE § 1775 (West 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 651.035(1) (West Supp. 1978). This reserve requirement is not as onerous as it
might seem because the reserves may include such items as the equity in the
property and equipment of the facility.
196 COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-13-110 (1978). Colorado requires an annual audit
to ensure compliance with the reserve requirement, id. § 12-13-111, as does Cali-
fornia, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1782 (West 1979). See note 184 supra &
accompanying text.
197 CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 1775(e)-(f) (West 1979); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 12-13-110(2)(e) to (f) (1978). In California, 25% of the reserves must
be kept in such liquid investments as cash deposits and listed stocks and bonds.
CAL. HEALTH & SA YnT CODE § 1775(i) (West 1979). In Colorado, the require-
ment is 10%. COLO.' REv. STAT. § 12-13-110(3) (1978).
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lows the Department of Insurance discretion to set the level of the
reserves that may be held in cash, stocks, and bonds on the one hand
and property and equipment used for the care of residents on the
other hand.
198
A simple-formula reserve requirement should be included in
the first-level regulatory scheme. The amount of the reserve should
be equal to at least eighteen months' principal and interest pay-
ments on the mortgage or bonds plus eighteen months' projected
operating expenses. The reserves need not be held in escrow, but
they should be liquid (cash and approved stocks and bonds). There
is no sense in including the value of the community's real estate in
the reserve because the property could not be liquidated to pay bills
without depriving the residents of a place to live. Reserve levels
should be monitored through annual audits. In addition, invest-
ment limitations should be strictly defined and enforced for all
funds of the community, even those in excess of the reserve re-
quirements.
5. Bond Requirements
The California, Colorado, Florida, and Michigan statutes all
require, or authorize the administering agency to require, the filing
of fidelity or surety bonds under certain circumstances. California
and Michigan authorize the administering agencies to require a
surety bond in any reasonable amount necessary to protect the
residents of the community.199 California also requires the bonding
of agents and employees who handle substantial sums of money.
200
Colorado requires a blanket fidelity bond in an amount to be set
based on the "magnitude" of the community's operations. 201 Florida
life- and continuing-care providers that fail to satisfy net-worth re-
quirements set by the Department of Insurance must file a surety
bond.202
Although it may be advisable to have a fidelity bond for em-
ployees who handle significant sums of money, general performance
198 F., STAT. ANN. § 651.041(1) (West Supp. 1978).
199 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1773 (West 1979); MIc. CoMp. LAWS
ANN. § 554.816 (Supp. 1979). See CAL. HEALTH & SA.zrT CODE § 1773.5 (West
Supp. 1980).
200 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1774 (West 1979).
201 COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-13-109 (1978).
202 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 651.021 (West Supp. 1978). Florida's previous statute
merely required life-care providers to deposit $75,000 with the Department of
Insurance. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 651.09 (West 1972). Under this provision, if a
community had gone bankrupt, the residents would have split the $75,000, regard-
less of their number. But bonds, deposits, or insurance must vary with the size
and commitments of the community, thus guaranteeing each resident a minimum
amount in the event of bankruptcy. See Comment, supra note 162, at 1023-24.
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bonds or deposits with administering agencies are not necessary,
nor, as will be seen below, are they the most desirable means of
protecting the interests of residents. One exception might be when
outside management companies are hired to run communities. In
such cases, a bond covering the management company would serve
to protect both the residents and the operator. Of course, only the
bonding company and operator would be responsible for evaluating
the management company's performance; the government would
still play no role.
In lieu of the bond provision, states should require continuing-
care operators to form mutual guaranty associations. Such a system
has been used quite successfully in the insurance industry.203 All
continuing-care communities would be required to join a mutual
guaranty program established by state or region.204 If one com-
munity failed, the other members of the association would be re-
quired to absorb its residents withou't the payment of additional
entrance fees. In this way, consumers of continuing care would
always be guaranteed the full performance of their contracts, al-
though the price of those contracts might have to be slightly higher
203 Forty-five states and the District of Columbia in 1976 required at least
some insurance companies to participate in mutual guaranty associations to guard
against the insolvency of an insurer. Hank, Post-Assessment Guaranty Funds: Are
They the Ultimate Solution to the Insolvency Problem?, 1976 INs. L.J. No. 643, at
482, 483. These state plans can be placed into two categories. A post-assessment
guaranty association, by far the more common, assesses its members following the
insolvency of an insurance company to generate a fund to pay off that company's
policyholders as claims become due. E.g., CAL. INsurANcE CODE §§ 1063-1063.13
(West 1972). A pre-assessment guaranty association assesses its members as nec-
essary to generate a fund that may be used to pay off the claims of any company
that may become insolvent in the future. E.g., N.Y. INsuRA~rcE LAW § 224
(McKinney 1976).
The success of these guaranty associations is undeniable. Hank, supra, at 484.
The National Committee on Insurance Guaranty Funds has stated that 60% to 70%
of the claimants of insolvent insurance companies are fully reimbursed on their
claims within six to seven months of insolvency. Without the guaranty associations,
claimants could expect to recover only 10% to 15% of their claims, and only after
seven to nine years. Id.
A continuing-care guaranty association necessarily would be somewhat different.
Because continuing-care communities have a continuing obligation to care for their
residents, the analogue to the insurance structure in the continuing-care field would
be a board of directors with funds at its disposal to operate an insolvent community
until all of its residents withdrew or died. Because this is a far more complex task
than simply paying off claims as they mature, the continuing-care association would
be saddled with far greater administrative problems than its insurance-industry
counterpart. For this reason, this Comment proposes that the members of the
continuing-care association simply agree to absorb residents of the failing community
without the payment of any additional entrance fee. Whether monthly fees would
remain the same is a problem that cannot be resolved here.
204 Because in many states the number of communities might not be sufficient
to allow establishment of effective statewide mutual guaranty systems, federal action
in this area might be desirable. See generally Kaplan, Regulation for Insolvency,
3 Fosum 166, 172 (1968).
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to cover costs of the system. An ancillary effect of this proposal
would be to stimulate the industry to develop a meaningful self-
accreditation program to reduce the likelihood of community
failures. 205
6. Lien Provisions and Preferred Claims
In order to protect residents in the event of liquidation or
bankruptcy, and possibly to discourage excessive encumbrance of
communities' property, all statutes but Michigan's provide for im-
position of a lien on property and equipment for the benefit of the
residents and/or for a preferred claim in the event of liquidation.
The states use two forms of lien provisions. California and
Colorado provide for a lien when necessary to secure performance
of the continuing-care agreements.0 6 Arizona, on the other hand,
requires that a lien be filed as a condition to receiving a permit for
the operation of the facility. 207 All three states subordinate the lien
to prior-recorded liens, and at least Arizona allows the administering
agency to subordinate the lien to certain later-recorded liens.208
There are also two forms of preferred-claim provisions.
Colorado and Florida give a preference to resident claims, but the
priority of duly recorded liens is retained upon liquidation.2
°9 Cali-
fornia, on the other hand, apparently grants an absolute preference
to resident claims in the event of liquidation.
2 10
205 Such self-accreditation programs have worked efficiently with hospitals,
nursing homes, mental hospitals, and schools. See HEAI..rTH REsouRcEs STATISTICS,
supra note 4, at 300; Interview with Lewis, supra note 14. In fact, seven com-
munities in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland are already attempting to
establish an accreditation program. See Kendal-Crosslands Annual Report for the
Year April 1, 1978 to March 31, 1979, at 6.
In addition, two communities in Pennsylvania, which does not regulate con-
tinning care, have attempted individually to eliminate some of the problems of
continuing care discussed in this Comment. For example, residents serve on the
board of directors at Kendal-Crosslands. Although Kendal is a Quaker-affiliated
community, all of its advertising and promotional literature disclaims any financial
connection between the community and the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting. Kendal
also voluntarily makes complete financial disclosure to residents and prospective
residents. Paurs Run, which has not yet begun operations, plans to place all
entrance fees received prior to opening in escrow accounts. Both communities have
also established stiff reserve requirements. See id.; Preliminary Official Statement
for Paul's Run Lifecare Community Bond Offering by Philadelphia Authority for
Industrial Development (July 27, 1979).
206 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1772 (West 1979); COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 12-13-112(2) (1978). The California lien attaches only to real estate; the
Colorado lien attaches to both real and personal property of the community.
207 Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-1805 (Supp. 1979).
208 Id. § 20-1805(I); CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 1772 (West 1979);
COLO. BEV. STAT. § 12-13-112(2) (1978).
209 COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-13-112 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 651.071 (West
Supp. 1978).
210 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1777 (West 1979).
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These provisions seem unnecessary, useless, and possibly even
counter-productive. Subordination to mortgages, other long-term
debt, and prior-recorded liens seems likely to cut into the residents'
rights so significantly as to make the entire exercise futile. More-
over, the uncertainty created by the liens or preferred claims, re-
gardless of their actual legal effect, may raise the cost of borrowing,
which increase the community will pass on to the residents.
Finally, reliance on statutory liens recorded by the administer-
ing agency for the benefit of residents may well be frustrated by the
new Bankruptcy Code. That legislation allows the bankruptcy
trustee to avoid any statutory lien 211 that first becomes effective
against the debtor (the community), inter alia, when its financial
condition fails to meet a specified standard 212 or when a third party
levies to make the lien effective.213  If the lien is created through
administrative action when necessary for the protection of the resi-
dents, both of these provisions are implicated; 214 if the lien is
created by administrative action at the time of certification, only
the latter applies. 215 But in both cases the lien is suspect: the
mutual guaranty association proposed above seems better suited to
meet the needs of the residents.
210
7. Advertising Regulation
Primarily in response to the many allegations of false advertis-
ing by continuing-care providers,2 17 all the states but Arizona regu-
late the content of continuing-care advertising. Florida and Michi-
gan mandate that a copy of all advertising and promotional
literature be filed with the state before publication or distribution.
218
In Colorado and Florida, the mention of any other organization in
211 A statutory lien is defined as a "lien arising solely by force of a statute on
specified circumstances or conditions," 11 U.S.C. § 101(38) (Supp. H 1978), and
clearly applies to residents' liens.
212 Id. § 545(1) (E).
213 Id. § 545(1)(F).
214 This is the case in California and Colorado. See note 206 supra & accom-
panying text.
215 This is the case in Arizona. See note 207 supra & accompanying text.
216 See notes 203-05 supra & accompanying text.
217 The most prominent example is provided by the Pacific Homes scandal in
California. See notes 85-96 supra & accompanying text. Advertising for Pacific
Homes communities prominently listed the Methodist Church as a sponsor. PAcmc
HOMEs BANxRupTcY REPORT, supra note 83, at 1, 61-62. In fact, the Church has
declined to accept financial responsibility for any of the communities, and residents
have sued for breach of contract. Barr v. Methodist Church, No. 404611 (Cal.
Super. Ct., filed July 20, 1979).
218 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 651.095 (West Supp. 1978); MicH. Comp. LAws ANN.
§ 554.826(2) (Supp. 1979).
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the literature or advertising must be accompanied by a statement
of the extent of the organization's financial responsibility for the
community. 219 California requires only that the statement of finan-
cial responsibility be filed with the Department of Social Services.20
The Michigan legislation simply grants the Corporation and Secu-
rities Bureau the discretion to promulgate regulations governing
the form and content of advertising.
221
Because the proposed first level of regulation is designed in
part to enhance the functioning of the market in continuing care
through education of consumers, advertising regulation is essential.
Misleading advertising, especially that which implies the existence
of financial connections between continuing-care communities and
unrelated but well-known and respected organizations, should be
expressly prohibited. All advertising and promotional literature
should be submitted to the administering agency and checked
against extensive ownership-disclosure data on file. Any mention
of outside organizations in the advertising should be followed, in
print at least the same size, by an explanation of the financial con-
nection between that organization and the community. Prior ap-
proval of advertising and regulation of its form and content are also
necessary components of a first-level regulatory scheme. Mere avail-
ability of ownership statements for public inspection is not sufficient.
8. State Investigative, Enforcement, and Rehabilitative Powers
Crucial to any effective regulatory scheme is the ability of the
administering agency to determine violations promptly and to
remedy them effectively.2 22 The tools available to state agencies are
the powers to investigate, to seek injunctive relief, and to rehabili-
tate communities in trouble.
223
The investigative powers granted by each of the five states'
statutes are slightly different. In Arizona, continuing-care exam-
iners with the same powers as insurance examiners are authorized
219CoLO. RE.. STAT. §12-13-113 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. §651.095(3)
(West Supp. 1978).
220 CAL. HEALTH & SA=T CODE § 1789 (West Supp. 1980).
221 MICH. Copy,. LAws ANN. § 554.826(1) (Supp. 1979).
222 In a similar regard, as discussed above, all five states require annual renewal
of operating certificates and/or submission by providers of comprehensive annual
reports to the administering agency. See notes 172-82 supra & accompanying text.
223 Although it is essential that a regulatory scheme have "teeth" in order to be
effective, a strong argument can be made that rehabilitative authority is not useful:
government does not have the best track record in efficient operation of institutions
far less complex than continuing-care communities. See note 236 infra.
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to conduct inspections as often as may be necessary.224 Michigan
grants a limited power to investigate when mandatory records or
annual reports are incomplete,225 as well as a more structured and
general investigative authority to protect against other violations of
its statute.228 Florida grants a general examination authority to be
exercised from "time to time." 227 Colorado requires both an annual
investigation228 and an annual audit.229 In contrast, California
permits the administering agency to conduct inspections at any
time 230 but allows the agency to rely on an annual audit in lieu of
inspection.
23 '
Enforcement mechanisms also vary from state to state. Colo-
rado, Florida, and Michigan all authorize injunctive relief against
violation or threatened violation of any provision of the legisla-
tion.232 As an important additional sanction focused specifically
upon the performance of administrators, all the states provide either
criminal or civil penalties for violation of the legislation by indi-
viduals. 23 3 Finally, Arizona, California, and Florida authorize the
administering agency to assume management of continuing-care
facilities in certain specific situations in order to rehabilitate com-
munities in serious financial trouble.2 4
2 2 4 Aiz. IEv. STAT. ANN. § 20-1809 (Supp. 1979).
225 MIcr. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 554.823 (Supp. 1979).
226 Id. § 554.833.
227 F.A. STAT. ANN. § 651.105(1) (West Supp. 1978). Third parties may
request inspection of continuing-care institutions as well. Id. § 651.111.
2 2 S Cono. B1v. STAT. § 12-13-103(f) (1978).
229 Id. § 12-13-111.
230 CAL. HEATH & SAPETY CODE § 1781 (West 1979).
231 Id. § 1782.
232 CoLo. BEv. STAT. § 12-13-114 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 651.125(3)
(West Supp. 1978); MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 554.834 (Supp. 1979). Michigan
also authorizes the administering agency to seek a cease-and-desist order. Id.
§ 554.828.
233 Apuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1811 (Supp. 1979) (misdemeanor); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1788 (West 1979) (misdemeanor); CoLo. REv. STAT.
§ 12-13-115 (1978) (misdemeanor); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 651.125(1), 651.13 (West
Supp. 1978) (felony and civil penalties); MicH. COMp,. LAws ANN. § 554.836
(Supp. 1979) (fines up to $10,000 or imprisonment up to seven years).
23 4 A=u. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-1808 (Supp. 1979); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 1790-1790.6 (West 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 651.114 (West Supp. 1978).
The California rehabilitation procedure, probably the most detailed, is triggered
when a continuing-care institution does not file its annual report or when the director
of the Department of Social Services has reason to believe that "the provider is
insolvent, is in imminent danger of becoming insolvent is in a financially unsound
or unsafe condition, or that its condition is such that it may otherwise be unable
to fully perform its obligations pursuant to life care contracts." CA. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1790 (West 1979). The facility is first allowed to propose a plan
to correct the deficiencies. Id. Next, in case of an emergency that threatens imme-
diate closure of a facility, or if no approved plan is forthcoming, the director may
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A comprehensive investigation and enforcement mechanism
should be considered only as a component of a second-level regula-
tory scheme. If the first-level minimum financial requirements and
market pressure from educated consumers prove insufficient to force
communities to follow sound financial practices, some governmental
corrective mechanism may be necessary. In that event, the following
scheme would be appropriate. First, full investigative authority
should be vested in the administering agency. This power should
extend both to on-site inspections and to examinations and financial
audits. Second, strong civil and/or criminal penalties should be
enacted to ensure continuing-care administrators' compliance with
the statutory requirements.
The remedial authority of the administering agency should be
somewhat different from that in any of the state schemes described
above. No corrective action should be permitted until the non-
complying provider is given notice of a violation and an opportunity




The primary corrective mechanisms should be injunctive de-
crees and the appointment of examiners to supervise compliance
with court orders. Such methods would allow the operator to con-
tinue to run his facility, a feature of some importance because of
his specialized knowledge of that particular community. Use of
rehabilitative procedures that displace the operator should be sharply
limited to cases of actual fraud or gross mismanagement, which
presumably will be rare. Such restrictions on rehabilitation ap-
pear justified by the lack of evidence that a government-appointed
administrator would be better able to deal with the serious prob-
lems that arise once a community is in financial trouble; indeed,
most of the evidence to date supports a contrary conclusion.
236
petition a court for appointment of an administrator. Id. § 1790.1. The adminis-
trator has broad powers, including total power over all property, equipment, and
funds and the power to perform all duties of the original provider. Id. § 1790.4.
The statute provides for termination of the intervention when the defect is cured,
id. § 1790.5, as well as for liquidation or dissolution of the provider if rehabilitative
efforts fail, id. § 1790.6.
235 Requiring the state to make precise showings of noncompliance with the
statute prior to judicial intervention will prevent the uncertainty that currently
accompanies private continuing-care litigation. See notes 131-33 supra & accom-
panying text.
236 The corrective mechanisms proposed in this section are analogous to the
reorganization provisions of the new bankruptcy code, Bankruptcy Code §§ 101-1330,
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (Supp. II 1978). A comparison between this Comment's
proposal and bankruptcy reorganization requires a brief glimpse of the old bank-
ruptcy procedure, however. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103
(1976), which still has limited application, has three business reorganization chap-
ters: X, XI, and XII. In Chapter X the appointment of a trustee is mandatory
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9. Rights of Self-Organization
In order to combat some of the harms of institutionalization
and the disincentive to care which may be present in some con-
tinuing-care institutions,22 Florida and Michigan provide rights of
self-organization to the residents of continuing-care communities.
Michigan simply requires that one resident serve as an advisory
member on the facility's board of directors.238 Florida's legislation
grants residents the right of self-organization, the right to be repre-
sented by individuals of their own choosing, and the right to engage
in concerted activity for the purpose of keeping informed or for
other mutual aid or protection.23 9 Florida also requires quarterly
meetings between management and residents to discuss income, ex-
penditures, financial problems, and proposed changes in policies
or services.2 0
when the bankrupts liability exceeds $250,000. Id. § 556. In Chapters XI and
XII, however, appointment of a trustee is optional, id. §§ 742, 832, and the bankrupt
usually remains in control of the business. See D. Eps nr & M. SH ,Eu),
TEAcmN MATiuu ON BusINss PEORGANZAnON UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
52 (1980). This disparity results from two apparently irreconcilable policies behind
business reorganizations: protection of creditors and the public (the Chapter X
policy) and facilitation of an effective reorganization to benefit both creditors and
the bankrupt (the Chapters XI and XII policy).
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, (codi-
fied at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (Supp. II 1978)), struck a different balance between
these two policies. First, all business reorganizations will be handled under a new
Chapter 11. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1146 (Supp. II 1978). Second, the debtor will
remain in possession of the business unless a request for appointment of a trustee
is made. Id. § 1104. "The standard provided in the bill directs the court to order
appointment of a trustee only if the protection afforded by a trustee is needed and
the costs and expenses of a trustee would not be disproportionately higher than the
protection afforded." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 234, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6193.
This Comment proposes that courts be required to apply a similar standard in
continuing-care rehabilitation proceedings. The chances for successful rehabilitation
are greatly enhanced if the continuing-care provider remains in possession. Like the
debtor going through reorganization, the provider is more familiar with his business.
If he remains, there will be no period of adjustment while the outside trustee
familiarizes himself with the unique features of the particular facility. Finally, the
cost of such an outside trustee is saved. See id. 233, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6192.
As does the new bankruptcy code, see 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (Supp. II 1978),
this Comment's proposal envisions appointment of a trustee only in the event of
fraud or gross mismanagement. But short of this result of regulatory failure, there
is no reason for resorting to the drastic remedy of appointing an outside trustee.
Finally, this Comment's middle-ground solution of having the court appoint an
examiner to investigate and supervise the affairs of a continuing-care provider mirrors
the provisions and policy of the new Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 1104(b). See H.R.
Rm. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 234, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CoNG. &
AD. NEws 5963, 6193-94.
2 3
7 See note 7 supra; note 142 supra & accompanying text.
238 MacE. ComE'. LAws ANN. § 554.812 (Supp. 1979).
2 39FLA. STAT. ANN. § 651.081 (West Supp. 1978).
240 Id. § 651.085.
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The right of residents to organize and participate in community
governance is an essential element of a first-level regulatory system.
Unlike some of the other components of the first-level program, the
purpose of granting residents this right is not primarily educational.
The existence of a residents' committee and the presence of at least
one resident with full voting powers on the community's board of
directors are essential checks against fiscal mismanagement and un-
desirable reductions in quality of care. Moreover, a residents' com-
mittee with a real voice in community governance preserves for
residents a self-esteem and sense of control over their own lives that
is often lost upon institutionalization.
10. Financial Disclosure to Residents
In order to mitigate some of the problems inherent in con-
sumer bargaining for nursing-care services,2' all five states have
enacted financial-disclosure requirements that fall into two basic
categories: (1) Florida and Michigan allow general public inspec-
tion, on request, of financial statements and annual reports filed
with the administering agency; 22 (2) Arizona, California, Colorado,
and Florida require that continuing-care providers furnish copies
of disclosure material to all residents and to prospective residents
or their advisors prior to the execution of the contract.
243
Complete financial disclosure to prospective and actual resi-
dents is one of the most important components of this Comment's
proposed first-level regulatory system. It allows prospective and
current residents and their advisors to evaluate fully the financial
position of a continuing-care community. In conjunction with
industry-accreditation programs, full disclosure is the best non-
coercive mechanism available to ensure compliance with minimum
financial safeguards. Communities that do not measure up to in-
dustry standards will simply not be able to attract residents.
The form and content of disclosure is critical. States should
require use of a standard form that elicits a complete summary of
the community's current and long-range financial picture. This
form should include space for a clear narrative description of the
financial condition of the community to supplement any raw data
supplied. The form should be completed and submitted to the
241 See notes 49-50 supra & accompanying text.
242FLA. STAT. ANx. § 651.091(1) (West Supp. 1978); MicH. ComP. LAws
ANNq. § 554.840 (Supp. 1979).
243Am. REv. STAT. A,- §20-1802(G) (Supp. 1979); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1779.3(a) (West Supp. 1980); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-13-106(1) (c)
(1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. §651.091(4) (West Supp. 1978).
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administering agency for approval once a year. All prospective
residents should be given a copy of this form as a matter of course
before signing a continuing-care contract. Current residents should
be provided with copies of the form annually and on request.
Finally, the residents and their advisors should be permitted access
to the community's full financial and income statements, as well as
to reports of any feasibility studies conducted. This right of in-
spection should be clearly and conspicuously stated on the dis-
closure form.
11. Regulation of the Contents of the Agreement
Another method of consumer protection utilized by the states
is direct regulation of certain terms of the continuing-care agree-
ment. An important result of some of this regulation is a reduction
in litigation and, consequently, in the cost of continuing care.
244
Only three states require that the community's contract be sub-
mitted to and approved by the responsible regulatory agency.
2 45
Two sections of the Florida statute that forestall litigation re-
quire that the contract contain a provision governing increases in
fees 248 and that no resident be permitted to waive his statutory
rights. 247 California, Colorado, and Florida all have general re-
quirements that clauses be included concerning the rates of the
community, the manner in which rates may be changed, the cost
and duration of services to be provided, and the health and finan-
cial conditions each resident must meet to remain in the com-
munity.2
8
Refund provisions vary. Only Florida and Michigan specifi-
cally require that the contract grant a right of full refund to a
resident who dies before taking occupancy.u 9 More generally, the
Florida statute requires that all refund terms be clearly stated in
the contract,250 adding that the contingency of death after occupancy
244 Requirements that contracts contain express terms on fee setting, termina-
tion rights, and refund rights would forestall, or at least simplify, most of the
continuing-care litigation that now occurs. See notes 108-30 supra & accompanying
text.
245 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1778 (West 1979 & Supp. 1980);
COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-13-106(2) (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 651.026(5) (West
Supp. 1978).
2 46FLA. STAT. ANN. §651.055(1)(i) (West Supp. 1978).
247 Id. § 651.065.
248 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1779 (West Supp. 1980); CoLO. REV.
STAT. § 12-13-106 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 651.055 (West Supp. 1978).
24 9 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 651.055(3) ('West Supp. 1978); MrcH. Co,. LAws
ANN. §554.810(a) (Supp. 1979).
250 FLA. STAT. A'r. § 651.055(l)(g) (West Supp. 1978).
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must be addressed.251 California's refund regulation is insufficient:
the statute requires a refund of entrance payments, less a reasonable
processing fee and the reasonable value of services provided, within
ten days of cancellation, 252 but it does not attempt to deal with the
contingency of death.
253
Regulation of residents' termination rights is also diverse.
Arizona, California, and Florida mandate a seven-day "cooling off"
period prior to occupancy, during which the resident may cancel
the contract with no penalty.2 54 In Florida, after the initial seven-
day period, the resident must be permitted to withdraw on thirty
days' notice.255 Arizona has no similar provision. California allows
cancellation of the contract without notice or cause by either party
within the first ninety days; thereafter ninety days' notice is required
from the party that wishes to terminate the contract.256 Michigan
does not limit the residents' right of cancellation, although the re-
fund allowed varies with the time of cancellation.
257
Finally, California and Colorado permit contracts that provide
for dismissal of residents with or without cause; in the event of
such a dismissal, however, they mandate a refund of the difference
between the amount paid by the resident and the cost of his care.
258
Florida's strict regulation allows dismissal of residents by the com-
munity upon thirty days' notice,259 but only for good cause. 2( °
Michigan's statute has a novel feature: it provides that residents
dismissed without good cause are entitled to immediate refunds as
specified in the contract, but that continuing-care providers may
mitigate potential damage awards by placing those residents in ade-
quate alternative facilities.25' Unless the terminating provider sup-
251Id. §651.055(1)(h). The contract may provide for retention of the
entrance payment by the community upon the residents death. Id.
252 CAL. HEALTH & SaETY CODE § 1779.8(a) (West Supp. 1980).
253 Id. § 1779.8. See also MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 554.810(c), (e) (Supp.
1979).
25 4ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-1802 (Supp. 1980); CAL. IEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 1779.8(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 655.055(2) (West
Supp. 1978). See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1779(f) (West Supp. 1980);
MIcH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 554.819 (Supp. 1979).
2 5 5 F A. STAT. ANN. §651.055(1)(g) (West Supp. 1978).
256 CAL. HEALTH & SATY CODE § 1779(d)-(f) (West Supp. 1980). Cali-
fornia also requires that each contract be accompanied by a notice explaining all
rights of cancellation. Id. § 1779(e)-(f). See also id. § 1779.8(b).
257 MicH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 554.810(c)-(d) (Supp. 1979). See id.
§ 554.810(e).
258 CAL. HEALTH & SAFTY CODE § 1780 (West 1979); COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 12-13-108(1) (1978).259 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 651.055(1)(g) (West Supp. 1978).
260 Id. § 651.061.
2 1 MICH. Comp. LAws A,-,e. § 554.810(2) (Supp. 1979).
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plies alternative accommodations, however, it must give thirty days'
notice before cancellation.26
2
Although this Comment's first-level regulatory philosophy of
minimal intrusion is violated to some degree by the comprehensive
regulation of contract terms, such regulation is essential to the suc-
cess of the overall scheme, and is also relatively inexpensive. This
Comment proposes the following regulations for contracts and con-
tract terms:
(a) The community's contract form must be approved by the
administering agency.
(b) The contract should specify that it creates no property in-
terest of any kind; it is simply a service agreement.
(c) The value of all assets transferred to the community, the
initial amount of the monthly fees, and the manner of changing
monthly fees should all be stated in the contract.
(d) Provisions limiting the permissible increase in monthly
fees should be prohibited.
(e) The contract should list all services to be provided and
any surcharges that may be levied.
(f) Any health or financial condition of a resident that can
allow the community to terminate the contract must be set forth
in detail.
(g) All rights of cancellation by the resident should be con-
spicuously stated in the contract. The requirement of a seven-day
cooling-off period is an excellent provision. In addition, some pro-
bationary period of at least thirty days should be allowed. The
contract should clearly explain any rights of cancellation thereafter,
but those rights should be mutual.
(h) Similarly, the community's rights of dismissal must be
clearly stated in the contract. This Comment favors a good-cause
limitation on the dismissal power of the community; perhaps, also,
the resident committee should be consulted prior to the dismissal
of any resident for any reason. Residents should also be protected
against eviction in retaliation for complaints against the community.
(i) The refund provisions should be clearly stated in the text
,of the contract (possibly in boldface type). Upon dismissal of a
resident, the community should be required to refund the entire
entrance payment less the costs of care not actually covered by the
282 Id. § 554.810(3).
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monthly fees. Authorization of refund formulas that are not cost-
based (such as one that allows the community to retain two percent
of the entrance fee for each month of occupancy) conceivably could
allow the community to profit by a dismissal. But for cases of resi-
dent withdrawal, a formula based on either actual cost or an accept-
able percentage per month of occupancy seems perfectly proper.
(j) The statute must also require that the contract specify what
refund, if any, will be granted upon the death of the resident.
25 3
12. Miscellaneous
Three additional proposals do not fit neatly into any of the
categories previously discussed. The first two are essential to an
effective first-level program; the third is harsh and should be adopted
only if third-level measures prove necessary.
First, the regulatory legislation should mandate a study of the
operation of continuing-care communities under whatever form of
regulation is adopted. An independent commission of private
citizens, experts, and policymakers should be formed to gauge the
effect of the legislation both on the financial stability of individual
continuing-care communities and on the continuing-care industry
as a whole. A comprehensive report with specific recommendations
for further or less regulation should be produced within a specified
number of years. This proposal makes the suggested first-level
regulation just that, a first step, representing one set of thoughts
about the absolutely essential steps that must be taken to preserve
an important institution. Five or ten years later, the legislature
will be able to step back and look at its handiwork with a great
deal more information than exists today.
Second, the legislation should attempt to limit continuing-care
communities' reliance on entrance fees to cover operating expenses.
This may be done in one of two ways. The statute could provide
an arbitrary figure, say seventy percent, and require that monthly
fees be set to fund at least that percentage of present operating
costs. Or, the statute could mandate that the continuing-care in-
263 The contract could provide for no refund of entrance payments, a fixed
refund, or a variable refund based on a schedule such as the following:
Time of Death Refund
Before occupancy Full
Within 90 days of occupany Full, less expenses
After 90 days of occupancy No refund
After 90 days of occupancy and Community retains two percent of
after notice of termination given entrance fee per month of occu-
but before departure pancy prior to death
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dustry develop an accreditation program that included a similar
requirement. Under the latter approach, the government would
have no need to regulate the financing of any community that met
the accreditation standards.2 64 This Comment strongly favors this
approach because of the continuing-care providers' higher level of
expertise and greater familiarity with some of the factors that might
influence the choice of a particular percentage.
Third, and only as part of a third-level regulatory program,
the states might consider regulation of fee setting, perhaps along the
lines of fee regulation in the insurance industry.265 In the continu-
ing-care industry, the adequacy of fees is as much a problem as the
excessiveness of fees. Both problems could be dealt with through
direct or indirect regulation. Comprehensive fee regulation is the
ultimate in government interference, however, and should be im-
posed only as a last resort.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to describe and analyze the little-
discussed institution of continuing care. In response to a number
of intrinsic failings and weaknesses in the institution and the cur-
rent regulatory vacuum, five different approaches to regulation have
been considered.
In an effort to avoid the trap of treating regulation as a panacea,
this Comment's suggested initial resolution of continuing-care prob-
lems is a scheme of nonintrusive governmental regulation designed
(1) to provide minimum economic safeguards for residents and (2)
to enhance the functioning of normal market mechanisms through
consumer education. The basic financial protection is provided
through the proposed reserve and escrow requirements, minimum
regulation of financing methods, and mandatory mutual guaranty
associations. Consumer education is to be achieved through pro-
posals for advertising regulation, contract-term regulation, and full
disclosure of community finances and practices. Finally, a study
commission required to report on the effect of these proposals will
serve as a bridge between this first-level regulation and a second,
possibly more intrusive phase.
264 Government reliance on a private accreditation system would not be un-
precedented. For purposes of Medicaid certification, the federal government
usually requires no more of hospitals than that they meet standards set by the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (1976).
285 For a general review of fee regulation in the insurance industry, see
B. KY=ToN, supra note 140, at 557-67.
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In the event the first-level regulation fails to stabilize the con-
tinuing-care industry, more burdensome devices, such as certification
requirements and authorization of the use of investigative and in-
junctive powers, are proposed. Should even these measures prove
insufficient, the third-level direct fee regulation could be imposed.
The proposals set forth in this Comment are realistic responses
to what are considered manageable problems of an institution of
great importance to our nation's elderly people. Their goal is to
guarantee that continuing-care communities can offer care that is
truly continuing.
